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Abstract
Co-management has become an important tool in the management o f Belize’s natural resources, 
including the world’s second largest barrier reef. There are many systems for co-management. 
Delegated co-management, where local NGOs serve as the decision making authority and 
community representative, is the most popular form for marine reserves in Belize. The use of co­
management offers a way to engage a diverse range of stakeholders in the decision making 
process. However, the success of marine reserve co-management is affected by a range o f local, 
national and international factors. Through personal observations as a Peace Corps Volunteer 
working in southern Belize, interviews with key individuals involved in marine co-management 
and review o f related literature, I explore how political and economic issues at the local, national 
and international level have influenced marine reserve co-management. Three Belizean non­
governmental organizations have signed co-management agreements with the Department of 
Fisheries for the management o f marine reserves in southern Belize. My research indicates that 
there are a number o f factors which influence co-management in this situation. These include: 
the ability o f local NGOs to effectively engage and represent local communities, the influence o f 
partisan national politics, unaccountable power by government ministers, a growing national 
financial crisis, and increasing investment by international conservation and tourism development 
interests; all o f which affect co-management o f marine reserves. The success that local non­
governmental organizations have had implementing co-management is linked to their ability to 
balance these diverse pressures.
Preface
When I first learned that 1 was on my way to Belize as a Peace Corps Volunteer I 
pictured myself working with a small rural community on a forestry project. My only expectation 
about living so close to the world’s second largest barrier reef was that I might find time away 
from my village to get SCUBA certified. As it turns out, J was spending my free time visiting 
those villages. One o f my main jobs as a volunteer for the Toledo Association for Sustainable 
Tourism and Empowerment (TASTE), a small Belizean NGO co-managing the Sapodilla Cayes 
Marine Reserve (SCMR), turned out to be surveying coral reefs.
While working for TASTE, I began to learn more about the coral reef as well as the 
complexities and realities o f marine conservation in Belize today. TASTE struggled to find 
footing, and funding, in a region crowded with community conservation organizations. I often 
marveled at both the potential and constraints of trying to involve communities in the bureaucracy 
of Belizean protected areas management. The more that I worked with TASTE and in southern 
Belize, the more confused I became. It seemed like marine reserve co-management was working.
I was watching as NGOs implemented new projects, provided jobs for local people and seemed to 
improve management at their marine reserves. But it was frustrating, especially after a day trying 
to get the Fisheries Department to sign off on the management plan that we had worked so hard 
on.
I had a hard time understanding what co-management was meant to do and then 
understanding why it w asn’t working. To me co-management meant sharing, collaborating and 
learning together. It meant more than just money. It meant give and take, and offered the 
possibility to include diverse stakeholders and ensure conservation as well as community 
benefits. These issues haunted me and the fellow volunteers I joined often for beers at the local 
bar. After a day struggling to secure funds and incorporate often demanding community 
members into the process of resource protection in the hopes of one day improving their lives, we
often questioned if our actions were having any real effect. We watched local people complain 
about the government and struggle to pay their bills. Our work was frustrating and we quickly 
learned life (and co-management) in Belize is a delicate balancing act.
This paper is my attempt to explore and evaluate that balance in hopes o f finding a way 
for co-management to contribute something valuable to marine reserve management. In an 
unexpected and wonderful way the islands and people working to protect that one piece o f the 
Belizean reef became my home and my family. My Peace Corps assignment was not at all what I 
imagined, it was better. I hope that this work can make co-management better too.
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Introduction
Over the past few years the traditional view of protected areas based on human exclusion
has changed as managers have realized the importance of involving community groups in
management activities. The call for greater user participation have led many countries to involve
local people in resource management (Borrini-Feyerabend, Pimbert, Farvar, Kothari, & Renard,
2004). These initiatives have been given a wide range o f names but are commonly referred to as
co-management (Berkes, George, & Preston, 1991). Although there is debate over the definition
o f co-management, most researchers agree that co-management is “the sharing o f power and
responsibility between government and local stakeholders” (Berkes, George, & Preston, 1991).
The development of co-management acknowledged that local people needed to be involved in the
decision making process.
There is no one way for co-management to occur; in fact most co-management involves
sharing decision making power between various players. Co-management contrasts with top
down management where the state, which traditionally has ownership over protected areas,
maintains all decision making power. The idea behind co-management is that the organization
with power looks to develop:
a partnership with other relevant stakeholders (primarily including local residents and 
resource users) which specifies and guarantees their respective functions, rights and 
responsibilities with regard to the protected area (Borrini-Feyerabend, 1996, p. 3)
The relationship between government and local stakeholders often develops over a period of time 
and can be seen as continuum from simple information sharing to complete delegated control.
This implies that each co-management arrangement is unique and reflects the complexity o f 
relationships between local users and government authorities (Pomeroy & Berkes, 1997).
Co-management exists across a spectrum from government based to community based 
and there are three general types o f co-management agreements 1) Consultative, 2) Collaborative 
and 3) Delegated (McConney, Pomeroy, & Mahon, 2004). Consultative management gives
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government the most control while delegated management gives community members or groups 
the most control. (See Figure 1.) The power sharing agreements developed in co-management 
arrangements are not static, it is a process requiring flexibility and adaptive management by the 
co-management partners (Borrini-Feyerabend, Pimbert, Farvar, Kothari, & Renard, 2004).
Figure 1: Continuum of Co-management Arrangements
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In the small Central American country o f Belize, co-management has emerged as the 
dominant paradigm for protected areas management. The adoption and practice o f co­
management as a mechanism for improving protected areas management has been supported by 
the Belizean government. The Belizean use of co-management has included the development o f a 
wide range of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and community based organizations 
(CBOs) as key players in the conservation o f Belize’s diverse resources. There are many 
different types o f co-management practiced in Belize, and each system has its own strengths and 
weaknesses. With an extensive protected areas system, including terrestrial and marine protected 
areas, and limited governmental resources; co-management can offer more effective 
administration of parks, along with national and local benefits (Meerman & Wilson, 2005). In
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this way co-management operates under the rubric o f sustainable development or the creation of 
sociologically, ecologically and economically resilient systems (Folke et al., 2002).
The difference between decentralization, devolution and co-management can be 
confusing. Most view decentralization as the transfer o f power to local government and 
devolution as the transfer of power to user groups (Meinzen-Dick & Knox, 1999). In the case of 
Belizean marine resource management, and throughout this paper, I use co-management to refer 
to the devolution and sharing o f power between government and a local non-governmental 
organization who serve as a representative o f the local community. The popularity o f this 
approach has been influenced by concerns that centralized management of these resources can 
lead to overexploitation (Pomeroy, 1999).
The growing recognition o f the need for greater community involvement in natural 
resource management has encouraged the adoption o f new methods, such as co-management, 
which give local people greater control over how resources are managed (Borrini-Feyerabend, 
Pimbert, Farvar, Kothari, & Renard, 2004). The incorporation o f community members in the 
decision making process is often highly complicated. Much o f this complication springs from the 
difficulties of clearly defining community. Local communities have traditionally been viewed as 
small spatial areas with shared social structure and values, this definition has been challenged by 
the growing realization o f the diverse factors and complexities o f community groups (Agrawal & 
Gibson, 1999). Stakeholder is another term used to describe the various organizations, social 
groups and individuals who possess a direct, significant and specific stake in the protected area 
(Borrini-Feyerabend, 1996). Although co-management was designed to include communities and 
stakeholders in the decision making process the complexities o f defining these terms makes the 
co-managers job o f representing and involving local interests much more difficult. In the 
Belizean context and throughout this paper I will use community to refer to the wider range o f 
local interests. Stakeholders refers to more specific groups and individuals (such as tour guides, 
fishermen, local conservationists) who have personal economic or management interests in
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marine resources. The complexity o f defining communities and stakeholders only further 
complicates local NGOs and Belizean government incorporation o f diverse interests.
Exploring Marine Co-management and National Forces in Southern Belize
Belize is home to the second largest barrier reef in the world and the longest stretch o f 
reef in the Western Hemisphere. In the 1980’s there was growing awareness across the globe that 
many of the world’s fisheries resources were threatened, and interest by decision makers in the 
promotion of more sustainable use o f these resources (Pomeroy, 1999).The need to conserve and 
protect the valuable resources o f the Belize Barrier Reef prompted the Government o f Belize to 
create a series o f fourteen marine protected areas. In 1996, UNESCO declared the entire reef a 
World Heritage Site, giving seven protected areas World Heritage Designation.
The application o f co-management to marine reserves is a rather new phenomenon in 
Belize. Generally in the Caribbean region collaborative co-management is the most popular form 
o f co-management for marine protected areas (MPAs) (McConney, Pomeroy, & Mahon, 2004). 
The collaborative model gives co-management partners an equal role in the decision making 
process (McConney, Pomeroy, & Mahon, 2004). Belize is one o f the few places in the Caribbean 
that has adopted the delegated form o f co-management as the primary model for marine 
resources. In this form o f co-management, the government has devolved the majority o f decision 
making power to local groups (McConney, Pomeroy, & Mahon, 2004). Delegated co­
management should provide local community members or groups the authority to make decisions 
and enforce laws within a reserve. In Belizean MPA co-management the government has favored 
using local Belizean non-governmental organizations as representatives o f local stakeholder and 
community interests. In this form o f co-management the government shares power with local 
Belizean NGOs who bear the responsibility o f representing community interest.
There are three non-governmental organizations working with the Fisheries Department 
for the co-management o f marine reserves in the southern portion o f the Belize. These
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organizations, and their relationship with the Fisheries Department, have developed over the past 
seven years and emerged as pivotal examples o f how government, local NGOs and communities 
can work together to manage marine resources. These three local NGOs are currently exploring 
new methods o f marine reserve management, and have formulated strategies and implemented 
management activities that to serve the environment and local communities. However, these 
NGOs face numerous local, national, and international challenges. Co-management is dependent 
upon a working agreement between diverse parties. These groups must agree upon and work 
towards some common goal for the management o f resources within a protected area, thereby 
balancing sometimes divergent interests.
In this paper I will evaluate how the three local NGOs negotiate the complex local, 
national and international forces affecting marine reserve co-management in Southern Belize.
The successes and failures o f these local co-management partners offer insights into how co­
management is approached and practiced at a local level to balance conservation and 
development demands. It is also important to understand the various national factors, such as 
power, financial resources and partisan politics that affect co-management. These forces have 
greatly influenced the way in which co-management is carried out. In addition, marine reserve 
management is influenced by a variety o f international factors, particularly global conservation 
NGOs and large-scale tourism development. The ability o f co-managers to move forward will 
require careful consideration o f these diverse local, national and international influences.
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History, Politics and Development
The geography and colonial history o f Belize have had an important influence on how the 
country has developed. The colonial system has greatly shaped the political and economic 
realities of Belize today (Shoman, 1994). In turn, the management o f Belize’s diverse 
ecosystems is directly related to the political and economic factors at work in Belize. It is 
important to understand how these political and economic forces emerged in order to better 
understand their effects on co-management.
Geography
The small Central American nation of Belize is bordered by Quintana Roo, Mexico to the 
north; Peten, Guatemala to the west and south; and the Caribbean Sea to the East. (See Figure 1.) 
Known as the British Honduras until 1973, Belize achieved its independence from Britain on 
September 21st, 1981. The second smallest Central American country, Belize has a land area of 
8,867 square miles (Bolland, 1986). Belize has been classified into nine major terrestrial 
ecosystems including: water, wetlands, coastal savanna (marine salt marsh), mangrove and littoral 
forest, lowland savanna, lowland pine forest, submontane pine forest, lowland broadleaf forest 
and shrub lands, and submontane broadleaf forest; and two major land use categories urban and 
agricultural (Meerman & Sabido, 2001). The second largest barrier reef in the world, the Belize 
Barrier Reef Complex extends 260km from north to south starting at Belize’s border with Mexico 
and extending to the border with Guatemala (National Biodiversity Committee, 1998). This 
complex contains over 1,060 mangrove and sand cayes, all reef types, and sea grass beds 
(National Biodiversity Committee, 1998). The reef and associated ecosystems are home to a 
wide range of species including 113 species o f corals, and over 1300 associated plant, animal, 
bird, insect and fish species (National Biodiversity Committee, 1998).
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Figure 2: Map of Belize
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Belize is divided into six administrative districts: the coastal districts o f Corozal, Belize, 
Stann Creek and Toledo and the inland districts o f Orange Walk and Cayo. It is the least densely 
populated country in the Americas with about 273,000 people, the capital o f Belize is Belmopan, 
but the majority o f the population lives in and around Belize City (Government o f Belize, 2003b).
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The population is ethnically diverse and includes Meztizo (48%), Creole (25%), Maya (11%) and 
Garifuna (6%), in addition to smaller groups of German Mennonites, East Indians, Chinese and a 
growing population o f American and British expatriates (Peedle, 1999).
History
Belize was once a part o f the expansive Maya empire which included parts o f present day 
Mexico, Guatemala, Belize, Honduras and El Salvador. It is possible that during the high point of 
the Maya civilization Belize may have been home to almost one-million Mayan people (Shoman, 
1994). After the Maya “collapse” in the early part o f the tenth century, scattered settlements of 
Maya remained throughout the region. The first Europeans to set foot in Belize were the 
Spaniards in the early part of the 16th century (Bolland, 1986). By the late 16th century British 
pirates entered the region, engaged in the logwood trade, and began bringing slaves to assist with 
the logging operations. Over the next hundred years British and Spanish settlers were often in 
conflict over territorial control. On September 10th, 1798 these confrontations came to head at the 
battle o f St. George’s Caye, where the British defeated the Spanish (Shoman, 1994). This defeat 
gave way to a tacit understanding between the two parties allowing British presence and use of 
natural resources in what was considered Spanish territory. In 1859, the British and then 
independent nation o f Guatemala signed the Anglo-Guatemalan treaty giving the British control 
of the area that is present day Belize, in exchange for the construction of a road between 
Guatemala City and the Atlantic Coast (Shoman, 1994). In 1871, British Honduras officially 
became a Crown Colony (Shoman, 1994). As the colony developed it was gradually accorded 
more autonomy becoming self governing in 1964, British Honduras became officially known as 
Belize in 1973 and finally achieved independence in 1981 (Shoman, 1994).
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Political Administration
The Belize Constitution outlines the political structure of the country. Belize is a
Parliamentary Democracy based on the Westminster System, with the Queen of England as the
official head of state. The queen is represented by the Belizean Governor General, who has
official responsibility (mainly ceremonial) for the appointment of the Prime Minister, Cabinet and
Senate. There are two branches o f the government: the Executive and the Legislative. The
Executive Branch consists of the Prime Minister and Cabinet Ministers, while the Legislative
Branch includes the House of Representatives and the Senate (Government o f Belize, 2000a).
The Executive Branch has the vast majority of the power in the Belizean government.
The Prime Minister is appointed by the Governor General after the general elections as the leader
of the party with the most representatives in the in the House (Government of Belize, 2000a). The
Prime Minister is required to call elections every five years although they can be called earlier
(Government o f Belize, 2000a). The Governor General then appoints Ministers o f Cabinet on
advice from the Prime Minister. Members o f the Cabinet must come from either the House of
Representatives or the Senate (Government of Belize, 2000a). These members are the basic
policy making arm o f the government. Cabinet members are responsible for “every part o f the
Government’s administration” (Government o f Belize, 2003c). Each Minister is assigned a
portfolio which encompasses his or her responsibilities. According to the Government o f Belize
(GOB) website Ministers:
...must all defend the policy o f  the Government in both o f  the Houses. They may disagree 
inside the cabinet but once a decision is made all are obliged to defend that policy and it 
is never known that any one o f  them did not agree with this or that policy  (Government o f 
Belize, 2003c, 1 4).
This idea of a united front is referred to as “collective responsibility” and if a minister is 
unwilling to commit to collective responsibility he or she is expected to resign his or her position 
(Shoman, 1987). The Westminster governmental model which Belize has adopted gives the 
executive branch almost complete control over the decision making process (McAllister, 2004;
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Shoman, 1987). Typically the cabinet members are chosen from ranking members o f the ruling 
party and the composition o f the cabinet and/or portfolios o f Ministers can change at any time. It 
is the cabinet that decides policy which is passed into law by the Legislative branch. (A list of 
current Ministries is provided in Appendix A.)
The Legislative Branch is composed o f an elected House o f Representatives and an 
appointed Senate. Currently, the House has 29 members representing constituencies based on 
population: Orange Walk, Cayo, and Corozal with four; Stann Creek and Toledo with two; and 
Belize with thirteen- 10 within Belize City (Barry, 1995). House members are responsible for the 
passing o f all laws. The other portion of the Legislative Branch is the Senate which consists o f 
twelve members appointed by the Governor General on the advice of various political and civil 
society leaders. The Senate is responsible for the ratification o f all bills. Although “in theory, the 
Cabinet is responsible to the National Assembly and through the National Assembly to the people 
who may call it to account at the next General Elections,” for the most part the Legislative Branch 
serves as a pool o f candidates for the more influential cabinet positions (Government o f Belize, 
2003c, If 6).
Belize’s history as a crown colony has had a large affect on its political development. 
Unlike the majority o f its neighbors, Belize has been free o f the violent political strife that has 
characterized Central America. Throughout its colonial history British Honduras applied a type 
o f rudimentary democracy. During the early years, the loggers o f British Honduras were 
governed by a system o f Public Meeting (Bolland, 1986). The middle part o f the twentieth 
century saw a rise in political participation with the unions and women entering the political 
arena, laying the ground work for the formation of new political parties (Shoman, 1987). In 1954 
these struggles were rewarded with universal adult suffrage (Bolland, 1986). A new constitution 
was introduced in 1961 in preparation for self government, which was awarded in 1964 (Bolland, 
1986). This constitution formed a Legislative Assembly and signaled the beginning o f party
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politics in the country (Shoman, 1987). From the 1960’s until independence in 1981, freedom 
from colonial rule was the driving political rallying cry.
The first legislative elections in 1961 were dominated by George Price and the People’s 
United Party (PUP), who won all o f the seats (Shoman, 1987). The People’s United Party had 
grown from the nationalist and union movements that dominated politics in the early part o f the 
twentieth century (Shoman, 1987). The PUP, with the support o f the unions, was a major anti­
colonial force. During the 1960’s a number different political groups arose in opposition to the 
People’s United Party. In 1973, after a number o f splits and name changes these opposition 
political groups formed the United Democratic Party (UDP) which became the major opposition 
party to the PUP (Shoman, 1987). While the constitution does not explicitly mandate a two party 
system, the British supported creation o f a two party political system based on the British model, 
which is what exists in Belize today (Shoman, 1987).
The British declared their intent for the independence o f British Honduras in 1961 
(Shoman, 1994). However it was the Guatemalan Issue and its associated security concerns, not 
British opposition, that was the major impediment to Belizean independence (Shoman, 1994).
The British claim to the area o f present day Belize has been challenged by the Guatemalans since 
the British entered the area. When Guatemala rewrote its constitution in 1945 it included the land 
that is now Belize as a part o f its national territory. This brought new life to concerns over 
territorial integrity which grew into the Guatemala Issue. In 1948 Guatemala threatened to 
invade British Honduras. This threat was answered by the placement o f British troops along the 
western border to defend the boundaries and land of British Honduras (Shoman, 1994). 
Negotiations between Britain-British Honduras and Guatemala began in 1962 and were broken 
o ff and restarted multiple times during the 1960’s and 1970’s (Shoman, 1994). This was 
accompanied by continual threats of Guatemalan invasion, followed by British reinforcements 
along the border (Shoman, 1994). Belize took its case to the United Nations in 1975 and in 1980 
a resolution was passed with important US support calling for Belize’s secure independence. In
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1980 after the negotiations dictated by the UN resolution between Guatemala and Britain broke 
down, Britain reluctantly agreed to guarantee security after independence. This removed all 
obstacles to Belize's independence and on September 21st, 1981 Belize became an independent 
nation. A few weeks later Belize became a recognized member of the United Nations and the 
Organization of American States (Shoman, 1994).
It was the lead up to Belizean Independence which cemented the dominance o f the PUP 
and UDP as the major political parties. During the 1979 election the UDP toned down some of 
its anti-colonial rhetoric, began stressing economic issues, and came close to overthrowing the 
longstanding dominance of George Price and the PUP (Shoman, 1987). When the first elections 
of a newly independent Belize were called in 1983 the UDP developed an opposition strategy 
which focused on the need for foreign investment and private-sector solutions (Barry, 1995). This 
coupled with desire for change from George Price’s PUP dominance, led to a UDP victory in that 
election (Shoman, 1987). During much of the 1980’s the UDP was more pro-US and anti­
communist than the PUP (Barry, 1995). However, this characterization has largely dissipated in 
recent years as both parties have adopted similar economic and political strategies. Up until the 
elections in 2003, control o f the government had alternated between PUP and UDP. In the 2003 
elections, the PUP government led by the Hon. Said Musa was re-elected. The next national 
elections will likely not be called again until 2008.
The importance of politics in Belize can not be overstated. Politics pervades everything 
in Belizean life. The two-party system which depends upon a powerful cabinet has effectively 
limited public involvement in policy formulation and decision making (Shoman, 1987). In 
addition, Belizean politics is volatile and there is intense animosity between the parties (Personal 
Observation). These conflicts over political dominance increasingly impact the country and 
natural resource management. The consequences o f political decisions are felt in all sectors, 
including marine conservation.
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Economy and Development
As a member of the British Commonwealth, the economy and society o f Belize were 
heavily influenced by colonial politics and ideology. Until the middle part of the twentieth 
century British Honduras was largely dependent on the extraction of timber resources including 
logwood and later mahogany and chicle (used as a base for gums). Logging was conducted by 
groups of slaves or hired workers who traveled far to the interior o f the country along suitable 
rivers and streams. Harvested logs were then floated down the rivers to Belize City where they 
would be shipped to their destination, mainly Europe. The colonial focus on the logging 
economy saw little need for diversified local economic development or infrastructure, such as 
roads and local markets. The colonial powers used the logging work schedule, policy, and low 
population density to discourage other types o f development. Throughout this paper I will use the 
term development in the traditional economic sense to indicate economic growth through the 
provision o f jobs and accumulation o f wealth.
The uncertainty o f the British land claim and lucrative timber economy pushed export 
oriented agricultural development to the background for much of the colonial period (Shoman, 
1994). It w asn’t until 1950’s when timber exports started to decline that agriculture started to 
become an important economic earner. This shift in colonial policy from extraction to production 
was driven by British policy and the dwindling economic viability of the forestry sector (Camille,
1994). Initial agricultural development was in sugar. When the British granted Belize 
preferential access to sugar markets and quotas, the British company Tate and Lyle quickly 
became involved in the sugar industry (Barnett, 1995). Most of the investment in sugar was 
focused on the northern part o f the country, and in 1959 sugar replaced timber as the major export 
earner (Bolland, 1986). In addition to sugar, bananas and citrus were promoted by the British and 
developed into major exports. The growing agricultural sector required more infrastructural 
development including roads linking major towns. Today the triad o f sugar, bananas and citrus 
continues to make up about 60% of total export earnings, with fisheries and a small processing
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sector making growing contributions to the economy. (Government o f Belize, 2003a). All three 
o f the major exports are characterized by high price volatility and were initially protected through 
trade agreements between Britain, the US or the European Community (Medina, 1998).
Recently, price protections have evaporated leaving Belize in a perilous position in the 
international market. Because o f its small size and higher labor costs Belize is poorly equipped to 
compete with larger agricultural economies in Latin America.
In addition to the terrestrial resources, the coastal region o f Belize has been extensively 
utilized for centuries, and its economic contribution is estimated at about US $150 million 
annually (Coastal Zone Management Authority and Institute, 2001b). Some of Belize’s most 
important economic activities including: tourism, fishing and aquaculture occur in the coastal 
zone. Fisheries exports including finfish, conch and lobster contribute about US $10 million per 
year to the economy (Coastal Zone Management Authority and Institute, 2001b). In recent years 
there has been a growing trend to expand aquaculture, specifically shrimp farming. Including 
aquaculture, the combined earnings from the fisheries sector was almost US $50 million in 2003 
(Belize Central Bank, 2004).
Over the past fifteen years Belize’s economic policy has incorporated rapidly growing 
tourism. Belize was at the forefront o f the 1990’s burgeoning global ecotourism market. In 1995 
Belize was the focus of an Audubon Society documentary which made an example o f Belize’s 
eco friendly approach to tourism development (Wood & Bell, 1995). Tourism and its associated 
service industry, accounted for an estimated 23% o f GDP and was the largest contributor to 
economic growth in 2004 (World Travel and Tourism Council, 2004). Much of that tourism is 
marine based and focused at the Northern Cayes. In fact the barrier reef was the original draw for 
tourists, with Belize gaining a reputation in the 1970’s as a dive destination. Belize continues to 
aggressively promote itself as an ecological and cultural wonderland with reef, jungle and Mayan 
ruins to satisfy every taste (Belize Tourism Board, 2005a). In addition to the eco-tourism market,
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cruise tourism has become an important economic outlet in recent years (Launchpad Consulting 
& Russell, 2005).
Current Political and Economic Outlook
Belize continues to feel the effects o f its colonial history (Shoman, 1994). The 
Westminster parliamentary system adopted by Belize and many other former British colonies, has 
limited political discussion and polarized party politics. Many island states, with their small size 
and population, have limited potential for industrial development and are dependent on single 
commodities, foreign aid, remittances, and export markets (Gossling, 2003). The consequences 
of the political and economic realities in Belize today continue to influence everything from 
community relations to national conservation policy.
The political reality o f small nations like Belize was not taken into consideration when 
the legal and political systems were established. Shoman notes, “ ...it was a forgone conclusion 
that it [the constitution] would follow the pattern established by Britain” (Shoman, 1987, p. 52). 
The failure to consider the unique aspects o f Belizean culture created a political system that is rife 
for corruption and abuse. George Price and the PUP’s dominance created a political system that 
focuses on nationalism and leadership, often detracting from a debate over social, economic and 
resource development and management issues (Shoman, 1987). Consequently, few differences in 
policy exist between the two parties today. In small societies, politics often becomes personal 
and partisan loyalty important (Benedict, 1967). In a political system that typically operates 
behind closed doors (e.g. cabinet meetings) there is little opportunity for public input or 
discussion. This tends to impact every decision and action carried out in the country.
Although party loyalty runs deep, today there are growing similarities in policy and 
governing styles between the PUP and UDP. One o f the major critiques o f the Westminster style 
o f government in Belize has been its failure to effectively incorporate majority need (Shoman, 
1994). Both parties participate in what Shoman labeled as “clientilism” which he described as
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“rewarding supporters with contracts, jobs, land and other favours” (Shoman, 1994, p. 255). 
Shoman goes on to say:
No matter what party is in power, the gap between the rich and poor widens, the 
economic and social systems are unchanged, corruption strives unabated and foreign  
influence increases. (Shoman, 1994, p. 255)
The People’s United Party governs Belize today and was victorious in both the 1998 and 2003 
elections, securing Prime Minister Said M usa’s position. Musa is the first prime minister to serve 
a second term since George Price. He has had to deal with a number o f major issues including: 
two significant hurricanes, declining exports and drop in tourism after September 11-all o f which 
have led to a slowing o f the economy (Government of Belize, 2003 a). In addition to economic 
troubles, Musa has been faced with party divisions within the PUP, including the 2004 
resignation and later reintegration o f seven o f his own cabinet members, including the current 
Deputy Prime Minister (Ramos, 2004a). A growing number o f scandals, cabinet reshuffles and 
budgetary problems have led to a feeling o f uncertainty amongst many Belizeans (Personal 
Observation). The UDP opposition led by Hon. Dean Barrow has attempted to exploit these 
problems, and at the recent municipal elections the UDP was the overwhelming winner securing 
64 o f 67 available positions (Channel 5 Belize, 2006). This recent development will likely 
contribute to tensions as both the PUP and UDP struggle to find firm footing for their political 
parties and the nation.
Like the current political situation the Belizean economy is in flux and highly vulnerable. 
Services contributed nearly 60% o f GDP in 2002, while agriculture (specifically citrus, bananas 
and sugar) contributed 60% o f export revenue (Government of Belize, 2003a). The Belizean 
economy is dominated by a few agricultural commodities which are increasingly vulnerable to 
price fluctuations and international market pressure. With declining access to preferential 
markets, almost all Caribbean nations, including Belize, face difficult financial choices (Medina, 
1998). In response to similar challenges, many island countries have turned to tourism
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development as a means to generate both employment and revenue, and to safeguard important 
cultural and natural resources (Gossling, 2003). Although tourism offers an answer to some 
financial problems, September 11th illustrated its vulnerability as well. Currently, Belize is 
exploring ways to secure new revenue strategies, including tourism, based on its abundant natural 
resources.
The confluence o f economic and political forces affects all levels o f Belizean society.
The impact of these factors on marine resource management will be explored in the following 
sections. Effective co-management o f natural resources depends on strong relationships between 
government and local communities, and requires close cooperation between numerous 
government agencies. This support can be difficult when government is focused on other issues. 
Despite its value to the country, the marine ecosystem is currently threatened by over fishing, 
uncontrolled tourism, infrastructure development, and pollution, making it difficult to manage.
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Site Description Southern Belize
Southern Belize, defined as the southern half o f the Stann Creek District and the entire 
Toledo District, currently confronts rapid development. The population o f Southern Belize 
includes Mopan and Kekchi Maya living in small villages in the forested interior. A mix o f 
Creole, Garifuna and East Indian dominate the coastal region especially the coastal town o f Punta 
Gorda, the district town of Toledo. Placencia, located at the tip o f the Placencia peninsula in 
southern Stann Creek, is a rapidly growing tourist destination. The Toledo District is often called 
the “forgotten district”, and is the poorest and least developed district in the country. Until 2003, 
the road connecting Punta Gorda to the rest o f the country was not paved and prone to flooding. 
The lack o f easy access has played a major role in the slow development of southern Belize.
Lack o f significant economic development, low population density and rich natural resources 
have recently brought international attention to this area, and development strategies are being 
debated.
In Southern Belize the majority o f the ethnically diverse rural population relies upon 
traditional livelihoods such as agriculture or fisheries (Belize Forest Department & United 
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, 2004). The Maya population living in the forested 
Maya Mountains depends upon milpa agriculture (i.e., shifting cultivation). In the 1990’s the 
GOB was active in promoting logging in this highly forested region, however that plan was 
thwarted by the 2001 hurricane (DeVries et al., 2003). The past few years have seen the growth 
o f shrimp farming, which has become a major economic earner and has provided jobs. However, 
it is ecotourism that has been the most heavily touted development opportunity (Blackstone 
Corporation, 1998; Woods, Perry, & Steagall, 1994). Southern Belize boasts a triad o f marine, 
terrestrial and cultural attractions. There has been some success promoting guesthouses in 
interior villages and a few ecotourism lodges have been built in recent years. However, despite 
the attention, few visitors stay long in Punta Gorda and most pass through on the way to or from
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Guatemala. While tourism development has remained stagnant in Toledo, development in 
Placencia has doubled in the past ten years (Personal Communication,,, L. Herrera, 2005).
Poverty in the Toledo district is the highest in the nation with close to 60% of the 
population living below the poverty line (Belize Forest Department & United Nations Food and 
Agriculture Organization, 2004). The high incidence o f poverty has made southern Belize the 
focus of many GOB development initiatives in the past five years, including two intensive 
development projects with financing from international lenders. Despite impressive investments 
and substantial efforts, most local residents have seen little improvements in their daily lives 
(DeVries et al., 2003).
Southern Belize is home to the majority o f Belize’s protected areas. The abundant 
natural resources of Southern Belize are due in part to high annual rainfall, low population 
density, high species diversity and the wide range o f different ecosystems. The relatively healthy 
ecosystems support threatened and endangered species such as jaguar, manatee and whale sharks. 
The high ecological diversity has brought this region to the attention o f international donors and 
conservation organizations that, working with local NGOs, have highlighted the need for resource 
conservation and protection.
The cultural dynamics o f Southern Belize can impact on the effectiveness of any 
conservation or development action. The southern portion o f Belize is the focus o f Guatemala’s 
continuing claim which remains unresolved (Shoman, 1994). Questions o f sovereignty continue 
to haunt the region, especially the Sapodilla Cayes which make up the southern portion of the 
Belize Barrier Reef. The proximity to Guatemala and Honduras has also encouraged migration, 
and a lack o f infrastructure has led to the development o f informal trade networks between Belize 
and Guatemala. The high density o f poor landless Maya in the interior has led to a local and 
national debate over land reform and indigenous rights (Belize Forest Department & United 
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, 2004).
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All of these factors have affected the development o f southern Belize. One o f the 
responses to these problems has been the establishment o f a network of aid workers, development 
professionals, civil society and non-governmental organizations. The prevalence o f these 
organizations has created an interesting dynamic in the region. Most people consider themselves 
stakeholders in a wide range of different projects from marine conservation to land rights. On 
any given day in Punta Gorda numerous people attend meetings and trainings in association with 
the activities of one local NGO or another. It is often lamented that there are more acronyms than 
residents in Punta Gorda. The proliferation o f organizations has also created a situation where 
local groups compete with one another for funding, participants and recognition (DeVries et al., 
2003).
Southern Belize also makes up an important part o f the Gulf of Honduras. The gulf 
covers about 10,000 km2 and extends from Sittee River in Belize, south east to Punta Sal in 
Honduras. The area includes diverse coastal and marine ecosystem types and is home to a wide 
range o f species. In addition to its natural resources, the region contains a variety o f protected 
areas and almost half a million people, with 12.4 million living in the adjacent watersheds (ABT 
Associates & Woods Hole Group, 2003). A variety o f international and local NGOs strive for 
more sustainable use o f the coastal and marine resources o f the Gulf of Honduras. Although this 
paper will focus on the marine protected areas in Belize, it is important to remember that all of 
these areas lie in an important transnational area, influenced by the political, economic and 
development decisions made by the governments and people o f Belize, Guatemala and Honduras.
Within the Belizean waters o f the Gulf o f Honduras are four marine protected areas: 
Gladden Split Marine Reserve, Laughing Bird Caye National Park, Port Honduras Marine 
Reserve and Sapodilla Cayes Marine Reserve. All four o f these parks are co-managed with the 
GOB and a local non-governmental organization; Friends o f Nature (FON) for Gladden Split and 
Laughing Bird Caye, Toledo Institute for Development and Environment (TIDE) for Port 
Honduras, and Toledo Association for Sustainable Tourism and Empowerment (TASTE) for
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Sapodilla Cayes. Each organization has had specific successes and difficulties. I will focus on 
co-management o f marine reserves between local NGOs and the Fisheries Department and 
explore how these NGOs are affected by local, national and international political and economic 
forces.
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Objectives and Methodology
This research strives to evaluate how co-management o f marine reserves in Southern 
Belize is affected by local, national, and international forces. The use o f co-management by both 
NGOs and the government has had significant impact on the management o f marine resources. In 
the southern part o f the country local NGOs have taken responsibility for most on the ground 
management. I will examine how co-management is being carried out by the three NGOs 
working with the Belize Fisheries Department in the southern section o f the country and explore 
how this management is influenced by local, national, and international forces. Co-management 
requires negotiation between communities, and occurs within the political and economic realities 
o f developing nations (Pomeroy & Berkes, 1997). In order for co-management and conservation 
to function it is important to understand how these diverse issues interact.
From September 2003 to August 2005 I served as a Peace Corps Volunteer in Punta 
Gorda, Belize. I worked for the Toledo Association for Sustainable Tourism and Empowerment 
(TASTE). At TASTE I was involved in a wide range o f duties including working with local 
communities and stakeholders, grant writing, project management, biological research and 
monitoring, and education and outreach. This work allowed me to engage in participant 
observation and explore a broad range o f issues as they related to marine protected areas and their 
co-management in Southern Belize. I also personally observed how different organizations 
interact with communities and stakeholders and go about management o f their respective areas.
My position within the organization allowed me to develop relationships with a diverse range o f 
people involved in Belizean MPA management. It is important to acknowledge that as a young 
white woman living in a foreign environment my experiences and observations are biased. I do 
feel that for the most part I was accepted by the community, but my status was unusual as most 
Belizean women would not take on some of the roles that I did.
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From June to August 2005 ,1 conducted one-on-one interviews with a wide range of 
people involved in MPA management and related fields. These interviews were semi-structured, 
covering key topics and questions as they related to the goals of this research including MPA 
management, co-management practice, government policy, community, tourism and economics. 
(The list of interview questions/topics is included in Appendix B.) Interviewees were selected 
based on my assessment of their knowledge and involvement in MPA co-management, 
government policy and resource conservation. Some of these interviewees are people that I 
worked with and interacted with on a day-to-day basis, others I interacted with less frequently on 
a more formal basis and some I met only at the time of the interview. Table 1 provides a list of 
interviewees, their positions, and my level o f interaction with them.
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Table 1: List of Interviewees
Name Affiliation
Contact Level
Regular Formal Interview
Jack Nightingale
Toledo Association for Sustainable 
Tourism and Empowerment (TASTE) Z Z V
Lindsay Garbutt Friends o f Nature (FON) Z z V
Wil Maheia
Toledo Institute for Development and 
Environment (TIDE) z z V
James Azueta Belize Fisheries Department z V
Victor Jacobs Rio Grande Fishermen's Cooperative z z V
Glenford Eiley Village Chairman Placencia z z V
Carlos Galvez Mayor Punta Gorda z V
Janet Gibson
World Conservation Society 
Belize/Coastal Zone Management 
Authority and Institute (CZMAI) V
Melanie McField World Wildlife Fund Belize z z z
Alex Nolberto Belize Fisheries Department (PG) z z V
Godsman Ellis
Belize Association o f Conservation 
NGOs (BACONGO) z V
Phillip Morgan University o f Belize
Vincent Palacio
University o f Belize/Belize Tourism 
Board (BTB) •/
Imani Fairweather- 
Morrison
Oak Foundation/Coastal Zone 
Management Authority and Institute 
(CZMAI) z s
Will Jones
Freelance writer formerly with Friends of 
Nature s
Leandra Cho- 
Ricketts
University o f Belize /Coastal Zone 
Management Authority and Institute 
(CZMAI) s
Karl Castillo Earth Watch Institute z >/
Valdemar Andrade
Protected Areas Conservation Trust 
(PACT) /National Protected Areas 
Strategy Plan (NPASP) s
Osmany Salas
Forest Department/National Protected 
Areas Strategy Plan (NPASP) z s
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I conducted a literature review to better understand how community, stakeholder, 
manager and government perspectives relate to the wider picture of Marine Protected Areas 
management in Belize and the region. I have attempted to evaluate all of the current and 
proposed Belizean legislation and policy governing MPA management and the factors which 
affect it. I also reviewed reports and evaluations both by community and national level 
organizations, the Belizean government, international donors and conservation groups. This 
review provided background for the local situation and how local management decisions are 
affected by national and international projects and plans.
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The Practice of MPA Co-management in Southern Belize
Belize has developed a comprehensive system of marine protected areas. As this system 
has grown the country has incorporated co-management as a mechanism for improved 
management. In the southern part o f Belize three local NGOs have signed co-management 
agreements with the Department o f Fisheries for the co-management o f marine reserves. The 
efforts o f these three Belizean NGOs offer insight into the strengths and weaknesses non­
governmental co-management partners. The experiences o f these groups illustrate how NGOs 
have been able to incorporate local people in management and some o f the advantages o f co­
management.
Belize’s extensive protected areas system includes 36% of the country’s terrestrial 
territory (Meerman & Wilson, 2005). In Belize, protected areas can be declared under a number 
o f different legal instruments including: the National Parks System Act, the Forest Act, the 
Fisheries Act, and the Ancient Monuments and Antiquities Act. These multiple laws give 
responsibility for management of different protected areas to different government agencies. The 
Forest Department of the Ministry o f Natural Resources, Local Government and the Environment 
has statutory responsibility for protected areas established under the National Parks System Act 
and the Forest Act. These include the following categories o f aquatic and terrestrial protected 
areas: national parks, wildlife sanctuaries, natural monuments, nature reserves, and forest 
reserves. The class o f protected area indicates the level o f protection. For example, nature 
reserves are exclusively for biodiversity protection and research, while marine reserves 
incorporate multiple uses, including extraction, tourism, research and biodiversity protection 
(Meerman & Wilson, 2005). Under the Fisheries Act, the Fisheries Department within the 
Ministry o f Agriculture and Fisheries is legally responsible for marine reserves. The Department 
o f Archaeology, which is a part o f the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Tourism, 
NEMO and Information has jurisdiction over archaeological reserves. Despite the extensive
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system the designation of protected areas is not secure, as the relevant minister has the discretion 
to de-reserve portions or entire reserves (Government o f Belize, 2000c). Although, there have 
been no cases of entire reserves being de-reserved, areas under protection have changed and 
licenses for extractive activities have been granted in areas where these types of activities should 
not occur (Ravndal, 2002).
The division o f responsibility amongst different government agencies creates ambiguity 
and has led to overlapping authority (M eerm an & W ilson, 2005). In the coastal zone this can 
mean that the Forest Department, Fisheries Department and Department o f Environment have 
jurisdiction over different resources in the same protected area. The Coastal Zone Management 
Authority and Institute (CZMAI) was created to improve interagency cooperation, and thereby, 
management o f coastal resources. The initial activities o f CZMAI were supported with funding 
from international donors, however that funding expired in 2004 and the current status o f the 
organization is uncertain. In recognition o f the complexities of protected areas management a 
National Protected Areas Strategy and Plan has recently been drafted. The strategy written by an 
interdisciplinary taskforces includes policy recommendations which should clarify relationships 
and jurisdiction.
In addition to national legislation, Belize is signatory to a number of international and 
regional treaties to protect natural resources. Some of the international environmental treaties 
deal with issues including: Biodiversity, Climate Change, Desertification, Endangered Species, 
Hazardous Waste, Law of the Sea, Ozone Layer Protection, Ship Pollution, and Wetlands 
(Central Intelligence Agency, 2005). Regional treaties include the Central American Convention 
on Biological Diversity Protection, the protection o f Priority Protected Areas o f  Central America 
and the Alliance fo r  Sustainable Development. The preservation o f biodiversity is also the focus 
o f regional and international initiatives including the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor (MBC) 
and the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef System (MBRS), both sponsored by the Global Environment
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Facility (GEF). Although both are concerned with biodiversity conservation, the MBRS is of
specific relevance marine conservation.
The MBRS project consists of a fifteen-year plan begun in 2001, which aims to protect
the vulnerable and unique barrier reef system that stretches from Mexico to Honduras
(Mesoamerican Barrier Reef Systems Project, 2004). The objectives of this project are to:
a) strengthen Marine Protected Areas; b) develop and implement a standardized data 
management system o f  ecosystem monitoring andfacilitate the dissemination o f  its 
outputs throughout the region; c) promote measures which will serve to reduce non- 
sustainable patterns o f  economic exploitation o f  MBRS, focusing initially on the fisheries 
and tourism sectors; d) increase local and national capacity fo r  environmental 
management through education, information sharing and training; and e) facilitate the 
strengthening and coordinating o f  national policies, regulations, and institutional 
arrangements fo r  marine ecosystem conservation and sustainable use. (Mesoamerican 
Barrier Reef Systems Project, 2004, 2)
This project has targeted many protected areas along the reef system for specific improvements, 
hosted training sessions, systematized data collection, and worked with the governments of 
Mexico, Belize, Guatemala and Honduras to improve coral reef ecosystem protection. The 
project has been influential in providing resources and guidance for protected areas management 
throughout the region.
The need to conserve and protect the Barrier Reef prompted the Government of Belize to 
declare fourteen Marine Protected Areas (MPAs): eight marine reserves declared under the 
Fisheries Act and six declared under the National Parks System Act (See Figure 2.) (It is worth 
noting that two reserves were declared under more than one legislative act.) In 1996, UNESCO 
declared the entire reef a World Heritage Site and seven marine protected areas were given World 
Heritage Designation. Although Belize has declared almost 40% of its land area as protected, 
Pinelo found that only 25% o f the 71 protected areas were actively being managed; the 
preponderance o f “paper parks” is not uncommon in developing nations (Pinelo, 2000). Co­
management offers a way for government to improve management o f these parks by involving 
local community members (Pomeroy & Berkes, 1997).
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Figure
Source: (Coastal Zone M anagem ent A uthority  and Institu te, 2001a)
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In Belize there are a wide range o f co-management arrangements. The basic types o f co­
management practiced in Belize involve the Government of Belize (GOB) and one o f the 
following groups: 1) Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), 2) Community Based 
Organizations (CBOs), or 3) private organizations. In the MPA sector all o f the co-management 
agreements are between the GOB and local NGOs, with the NGOs representing local 
communities. The organizations involved with co-management in the marine sector include: the 
Belize Audubon Society (BAS), the Toledo Institute for Development and Environment (TIDE), 
FAMRAC, the Toledo Association for Sustainable Tourism and Empowerment (TASTE), 
GreenReef and Friends o f Nature (FON) (Coastal Zone Management Authority and Institute, 
2001a). These organizations all have signed co-management agreements o f some kind with the 
GOB and are responsible for activities at specific M PA’s.
Although co-management o f protected areas has been in existence almost since the 
conception o f protected areas in Belize, co-managers face serious constraints. First there is no 
formal national co-management framework. The Environmental Protection Act states that the 
government may
“...consult with any other Government department or agency, non-governmental 
organization, or any person interested in the quality o f  the environment or the control or 
abatement o f  environmental pollution... ” (Government o f  Belize, 2000b).
It is under this legislation that co-management has been implemented. The absence o f defining 
legislation has led to a variety o f different methods for the implementation o f co-management in 
Belize. In the marine sector all o f the NGOs involved in co-management have signed 
Memorandums o f Understanding (MOU) with the government specifying their roles and 
responsibilities. However, M OU’s are unique to organizations and protected areas. The recently 
completed National Protected Areas Policy and Systems Plan (NPASP) should clarify some of 
these issues (Meerman & Wilson, 2005). Other constraints to co-management in Belize are 
similar to those throughout the Caribbean region including: problems with organizational
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capacity o f both government and co-management partners, the lack o f resources (i.e. money, 
equipment, human resources), and lack o f adequate local community participation (Govan, 2003; 
McConney, Pomeroy, & Mahon, 2004). These constraints have challenged all parties involved in 
co-management and have required much give and take between co-management partners.
Organizations in Southern Belize
Three marine protected areas are co-managed with the Belize Fisheries Department. The 
Fisheries Department has signed Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) with Friends of Nature 
(FON) for Gladden Split Marine Reserve, with the Toledo Institute for Development and 
Environment (TIDE) for Port Honduras Marine Reserve, and with the Toledo Association for 
Sustainable Tourism and Empowerment (TASTE) for Sapodilla Cayes Marine Reserve; all of 
these Belizean NGOs serve as representatives o f local community interests. A fourth MPA in this 
zone, Laughing Bird Caye National Park, is managed between the Forest Department and FON.
(I will focus primarily on reserves managed between NGOs and the Fisheries Department.)
These three Belizean organizations have similar goals and objectives: promoting local 
development, conservation and sustainability. However, each goes about meeting these goals in a 
different way, and has had distinct successes and difficulties.
Friends o f  Nature
Friends of Nature (FON) is based out o f Placencia Village located at the end o f the 
Placencia peninsula in the Stann Creek District. FON is responsible for the co-management of 
Laughing Bird Caye National Park and Gladden Spit Marine Reserve. Friends of Nature began 
when a group o f local tour guides, fishermen, and business owners came together to protect 
Laughing Bird Caye from proposed tourism development in 1991 (Pomeroy & Goetze, 2003). 
Through the informal efforts o f this group, which called itself Friends of Laughing Bird Caye, the 
caye was declared a protected area in 1992 (Pomeroy & Goetze, 2003). In 1996, Friends of
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Laughing Bird Caye registered as an NGO and the marine area around Laughing Bird Caye was 
declared a National Park (Pomeroy & Goetze, 2003). During the late 1990’s Placencia was 
experiencing a tourism boom, with special tourist interest in the marine resources, specifically 
whale sharks. This led Friends o f Laughing Bird Caye to lobby for the creation of Gladden Spit 
Marine Reserve to protect the areas most frequently visited by the whale sharks. In 2000 
Gladden Spit was declared a marine reserve. That same year Friends o f Laughing Bird Caye 
signed a co-management agreement with the Department o f Forestry for the management of 
Laughing Bird Caye National Park. In 2002, Friends of Laughing Bird Caye merged with 
another Placencia based conservation organization changing their name to Friends o f Nature. 
Also in 2002, FON signed a co-management agreement with the Fisheries Department for 
Gladden Spit Marine Reserve (Pomeroy & Goetze, 2003). O f the three NGOs examined in this 
study Friends o f Nature is the best example o f a community-based conservation NGO, although 
today FON employs a staff o f 15 and is responsible for the management o f the two MPAs. With 
delegated management authority FON is empowered by the government to enforce reserve rules 
and regulations. They have been very successful at raising funds for conservation purposes and 
had an operating budget o f US$ 750,000 in 2005 (Personal Communication, L. Garbutt, 2005).
The Gladden Spit Marine Reserve is located at the end o f the central and most contiguous 
portion o f the barrier reef. At Gladden Spit the reef makes a 90 degree turn towards the coast 
(Pomeroy & Goetze, 2003). The marine reserve protects both the reef and nearby sand and 
mangrove cayes. This area is a well known spawning aggregation site. Between December and 
June over 25 different species o f fish congregate at Gladden Spit to reproduce, normally around 
the full moon (Pomeroy & Goetze, 2003). During April to May whale sharks (Rhincodon typus) 
frequent the area and are known to feed on freshly released fish spawn (Heyman, Graham, 
Kjerfve, & Johannes, 2001). Gladden Spit is one o f the few locations in the world that has 
geographically and temporally predictable whale shark aggregations (Pomeroy & Goetze, 2003).
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The whale sharks have become a major tourist attraction and FON has worked closely with local 
tour guides and fishermen to ensure protection of these animals and the resources they depend on.
Toledo Institute fo r  Development and Environment
The Toledo Institute for Development and Environment (TIDE) is the major conservation
organization in Toledo, working less than 100 miles from FON. TIDE is responsible for a wide
range o f different protected areas including Port Honduras Marine Reserve, Payne’s Creek
National Park and a number o f private lands, including a debt for nature swap parcel. In the early
1990’s The Nature Conservancy (TNC) expressed interest in southern Belize. Working closely
with the Belize Center for Environmental Studies (BCES), TNC promoted the Maya Mountain
Marine Transect (MMMT) to protect a stretch o f land from the Maya Mountains to the Barrier
Reef (DeVries et al., 2003). The MMMT would preserve a wide range o f different ecosystems
from rainforest to coral reef. When TNC’s funding for BCES expired in 1996 key proponents,
including TIDE’S present day executive director, kept promoting and garnering support for the
idea within the community for the next year and a half. In 1997, again with backing from The
Nature Conservancy, the Toledo Institute for Development and Environment. According to
TIDE’s website the organization was formed as:
“a grassroots initiative in response to the negative environmental effects from  activities 
such as manatee poaching, illegal fishing, illegal logging, destructive farm ing methods, 
and other types o f  unsustainable development ” (Toledo Institute for Development and 
Environment, 2003, ]} 1)
TIDE has grown rapidly over the past few years from an organization focused on the protection
o f manatees to an important organization active in a wide range o f conservation and development
initiatives. Originally staffed by volunteers, TIDE now is the largest private employer in Punta
Gorda with more than twenty employees, and has attracted international attention for its
conservation and community development work.
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The creation o f the Port Honduras Marine Reserve was the early focus o f the Toledo 
Institute for Development and Environment. After three years o f lobbying, the Port Honduras 
Marine Reserve (PHMR) was declared in 2000. In 2001 TIDE signed the first co-management 
agreement with the Department o f Fisheries for the delegated management o f the PHMR. TIDE 
worked with local communities to draft a management plan for the PHMR, and has developed 
extensive ties with local communities. The reserve protects the Port Honduras coastal 
embayment and extends from the mouth o f the Rio Grande to the mouth o f the Monkey River and 
includes almost 140 mangrove cayes (Heyman & Kjerfve, 1999). While the reserve primarily 
protects mangrove ecosystem it includes distant cayes that are home to coral reef. PHMR 
protects important lobster and finfish fisheries as well as key habitat for the endangered West 
Indian Manatee.
Toledo Association fo r  Sustainable Tourism and Empowerment
The Toledo Association for Sustainable Tourism and Empowerment (TASTE) is 
responsible for co-management o f the Sapodilla Cayes Marine Reserve (SCMR).
TASTE is a growing NGO that has struggled to establish itself and is often overshadowed by 
other more powerful local organizations. The history o f TASTE is intimately connected to TIDE 
and the Maya Mountain Marine Transect. The Sapodilla Cayes were seen by TNC as a key 
component o f the MMMT. At the time, the Sapodilla Cayes Marine Reserve, which had been 
declared in 1996, was operating as a paper park with no real management. Unexpectedly TIDE 
did not step forward to manage the SCMR, focusing instead on the creation o f the PHMR. In 
1999 the Belize Tourism Industry Association (BTIA) of Punta Gorda submitted a proposal for 
co-management o f the reserve. When the members o f the BTIA stepped forward to request 
management some people in the area (especially key figures associated with TIDE) expressed 
concerns that members o f BTIA were not prepared for the responsibilities of marine reserve 
management (DeVries et ah, 2003). In what was considered an attempt to change the balance o f
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power within the organization a large number o f TIDE supporters joined BTIA (DeVries et al., 
2003). The original BTIA members decided to form the Toledo Association for Sustainable 
Tourism and Empowerment to maintain control. TASTE pursued and was eventually granted co­
management o f the reserve in 2001. Unlike FON and TIDE, TASTE is engaged in collaborative 
management with the understanding that they will take on delegated co-management in the 
future. This arrangement means that the Fisheries Department retains day-to-day management 
authority and TASTE has struggled to identify its role (Personal Communication, J. Nightingale, 
2005). TASTE has primarily been responsible for community outreach and is well known 
throughout Belize for its environmental education program. Despite some successes, TASTE has 
struggled to secure funding and is constantly renegotiating its position in the world o f Belizean 
MPA management.
The Sapodilla Cayes Marine Reserve protects the southernmost region o f the Belize 
Barrier Reef. At this southern end the reef forms a J-shaped hook, which makes up the SCMR. 
The reserve includes a number o f sand cayes as well as extensive reef formations. The reserve 
was declared in 1996, the same year that it was named a World Heritage Site. However, there 
was no onsite staff until 2000. The reserve is home to a number o f important species and 
contains important nesting beach for the endangered hawksbill turtle. The SCMR has been 
extensively used by fishermen; it contains an important conch nursery and several spawning 
aggregation sites. Historically, it is an important tourist destination for people from Guatemala. 
(The SCMR has been a major topic for the Belize-Guatemala negotiations.) O f the marine 
protected areas included in this study, the Sapodilla Cayes is the least studied and has had a 
complex and frustrating management history.
Each o f the three organizations has been active in developing co-management systems for 
the reserves for which they are responsible. Although FON, TIDE and TASTE have developed in 
very different ways, all have established strategies to engage community and governmental 
partners. These three NGOs have different approaches and have had varying degrees o f success;
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however they all operate in a fairly similar manner. They are all locally based non-governmental 
organizations who have signed agreements with the Belize Fisheries Department for the 
management o f a marine reserve. While TASTE does not currently have delegated control over 
the Sapodilla Cayes Marine Reserve it is moving in that direction, which puts all o f these NGOs 
along a similar path and makes their efforts easily comparable. The following section details how 
these organizations have pursued their efforts and outlines some o f their achievements and 
challenges.
Strengths and Weaknesses of Co-management in Practice in Southern Belize
The adoption o f co-management in southern Belize has been a success for the reserves 
involved (Personal Communication, J. Azueta, 2005). The local NGOs involved in co­
management are all active and have garnered important community support for their initiatives 
(Personal Communication, W. Maheia, 2005; Personal Communication, J. Azueta, 2005). While 
these endorsements are encouraging, there are both strengths and weaknesses to co-management 
as currently practiced by the NGOs in the region. Some o f the more pressing issues include: 
community involvement in management decisions; effective communication between 
government, NGOs and local people; enforcement and education; research and monitoring; 
organizational capacity; and issues o f local power. In order for co-management to be successful 
in the long run; government, NGOs and communities will likely need to continuously evaluate 
and re-design relationships. FON, TIDE and TASTE have dealt with these issues in different 
ways and their experiences offer insight into co-management strategies.
Community Involvement and Communication
The “community” plays a central role in Belizean NGOs conception o f what they do and 
how they do it. The mission statements o f all three organizations emphasize sustainable use of 
marine resources with local participation and development as major goals. Often the ways in
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which communities influence decision making differs from organizational rhetoric. The reality o f 
running a conservation organization requires complex administrative procedures which can 
separate local communities from real decision making power. These problems are only further 
complicated by the inherent complexities o f defining community and identifying key 
stakeholders.
The most formal way that communities and stakeholders are involved with decision
making in the three organizations is through a board. All three organizations boast a board of
community members which includes various stakeholder representatives from the tourism
industry, local fishermen, conservation interests, local governmental representatives, and
community members. However as noted at FON
The dominant understanding o f  ‘community participation ’ seems to involve appointing a 
representative from  the community, regardless o f  whether that individual in fac t  
represents the many interests o f  that community, or indeed, communicates the activities 
o f  the managing NGO to its members. (Pomeroy & Goetze, 2003, p. 53)
This type o f approach is similar across all three NGOs analyzed here. In southern Belize, one
executive director commented, “Community involvement is dependent on the co-manager”
(Personal Communication, J. Nightingale, 2005). This can have inherent problems as
communities are not homogeneous and NGO dominance over the selection o f representatives and
involvement o f local stakeholders has direct effect on participation in the decision making
process.
The NGOs boards are deliberately chosen by the NGOs themselves to include a wide 
range o f different stakeholder interests. For example, the FON board is comprised o f the village 
chairs from each o f the five communities in which they work, as well as representatives from the 
Placencia Fishermen’s Cooperative, the local Belize Tourism Industry Association, the highest 
institution o f learning in the area, the Tour Guide Association and local churches (Pomeroy & 
Goetze, 2003). Choosing representatives from the leadership of other organizations often
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increases participation by local elite, leaving more vulnerable groups with no voice, as the 
disadvantaged often are excluded from participation or leadership in such organizations.
When the FON board was formed there was a conscious effort to incorporate as many 
local people as possible and give them authority. This was important because as tourism 
expanded in Placencia expatriate influence grew. As FON’s executive director lamented, 
effective involvement o f local players is very difficult (Personal Communication, L. Garbutt, 
2005). This is especially true when dealing with elected representatives who are prone to change, 
and may be uninterested in active participation in NGO agendas (Personal Communication, L. 
Garbutt, 2005). He indicated that “the two way flow o f information is difficult when elected 
leaders are not effective at communicating to local people” (Personal Communication, L. Garbutt, 
2005). The Executive Director also mentioned that lack of interest by local people led to 
questions about how participants should be chosen and who should be involved in the decision 
making process (Personal Communication, L. Garbutt, 2005).
Although the three NGOs boards function in slightly different ways, for the most part the 
boards are simply used as sounding boards for management decisions rather than engaging in the 
decision making process. Boards meet quarterly or annually and have little input in day-to-day 
management decisions, which are made by onsite managers or the executive director. TFDE’s 
board is responsible for oversight o f the organization’s activities. A number o f local people have 
indicated that in the few areas where the board is empowered to make decisions, such as hiring, 
the board most often acts as an arm o f the executive director (Personal Observation). TASTE has 
made some effort to incorporate stakeholders in management decision making. TASTE has 
created what it calls a management team that is responsible for assisting with day-to-day issues 
and reserve decisions. This type o f approach requires close contact between team members and 
reserve managers and has faced serious problems securing active participation in meetings and 
the decision making process (Personal Communication, J. Nightingale, 2005).
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In addition to the boards, by law each MPA in Belize is required to have a local advisory 
committee. This committee is comprised o f local stakeholders appointed by the Minister 
(normally leaders o f key organizations such as the tour guide association or fisherman’s 
cooperative). The advisory committee is charged with making policy decisions for each marine 
reserve. The advisory committees meet occasionally and have no real effect on management 
decisions. In fact, most o f the members o f these committees (and one could argue the boards as 
well) have little understanding o f the role that they play in reserve management (Personal 
Communication, J. Nightingale, 2005). Almost every advisory committee meeting that I attended 
at TASTE involved a long discussion about the need for the committee to further develop how 
they would be involved with policy formation. These discussions rarely went far and when I left 
after two years, the advisory committee was still struggling to understand how it fit into the 
management and decision making structure of the SCMR (Personal Observation).
The lack o f active management decision making by local NGO boards and advisory 
committees leaves the majority o f community participation in MPA decision making to less 
powerful, more informal mechanisms such as meetings and newsletters. This has left many 
community members without a clear understanding o f the activities o f the local organizations. 
Clear communication between government, NGO partners and the community is important and 
effective informal communication can be difficult to achieve. As McConney, Pomeroy & Mahon 
(2004, p. 21) indicate “excessive informality reduces the legitimacy o f the systems and structures 
o f management” . The lack o f comprehensive and agreed upon systems for the distribution o f 
information encourages rumor and speculation. Informal communication leaves community 
members unsure about their role in management and amplifies problems of community 
participation in the decision making process.
All three organizations have had difficulties developing effective methods for 
participation and communication. The most popular form of community outreach has been 
community consultations, an approach developed with international influence. All NGOs use
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this method as a way o f garnering public support for projects. There are a number o f problems 
with consultations as a means for communication. As mentioned earlier, the prevalence of 
“community” organizations in southern Belize has often led to indifference amongst community 
members. Most community meetings are well attended only if there is a pressing concern or 
issue on the table; otherwise many would-be participants have more important uses for their time 
(Personal Communication, J. Nightingale, 2005). Reliance on consultations limits participation 
to those who have the time, interest and ability to attend meetings and NGOs typically dominate 
the agenda (Pomeroy & Goetze, 2003). In addition, community consultations are expensive and 
often attract the same people who have already formulated an opinion o f the NGO and are more 
interested in argument than actual discussion (Personal Communication, W. Jones, 2006).
Although the mission statements of all three NGOs speak to the involvement of local 
people there are limited avenues for local participation in decision making. Boards, advisory 
committees and public consultations frequently only involve a select number o f local people who 
are often local elites. This makes NGOs less inclined to spend time and energy seeking public 
comment on activities (Personal Communication, W. Jones, 2006). In addition, when the public 
is involved they rarely see a clear outcome from their inputs (Personal Communication, V. 
Jacobs, 2005). Maintaining active and diverse participation in management is a major constraint 
to effective community involvement and an area all NGOs need to improve upon.
Education, Enforcement and Alternative Livelihoods
Localized MPA management has improved enforcement and education at co-managed 
parks, despite communications problems. Although community members are limited in the ways 
that they can formally participate in management decision making, these organizations are 
located near the reserves they manage. This close proximity gives local NGOs a better 
opportunity to interact with community members and greater understanding o f what is happening 
within the local community. These organizations are involved in day-to-day management
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activities and have greater awareness about how reserves may be impacted by local conditions 
than government officials in Belize City. All three NGOs have explicitly incorporated major 
resource users through formal and informal mechanisms: such as education, employment, and 
alternative livelihoods.
NGOs have developed programs to enhance management through community education 
and outreach. TASTE has developed a program that gives primary and secondary school students 
in the Toledo district exposure to coral reef ecology and the opportunity to snorkel on the reef. 
This program has been embraced by local teachers and students as an effective way to showcase 
the beauty o f the coral reef and highlight how individual actions affect the ecosystem. TASTE 
has recently expanded the program to adults, including fishermen in both Guatemala and 
Honduras (Personal Communication, J. Nightingale, 2005). TASTE’s education program has 
been hailed as a success and has been copied by NGOs throughout the country (Personal 
Communication, J. Nightingale, 2005). These types o f education programs help inform the 
public about NGO activities and raise awareness about the role local people play in the protection 
and management of reserves. One goal o f these programs is that better educated citizens will 
engage in management and policy decisions (Personal Communication, J. Nightingale, 2005).
The direct employment o f local people as NGO staff (i.e. rangers, etc.) is another way 
NGOs have sought more effective management. Local familiarity with resources can help 
management, as fishers possess knowledge about the state o f the fishery, as well as common 
practices. All three NGOs have made special efforts to employ local people in key positions. In 
some cases historic resource users, like gill net fishermen, have become actively involved in 
enforcement o f fisheries laws through employment as rangers. Both TIDE and TASTE are 
employing local fishermen as “community rangers”, drawing on their knowledge and frequent 
presence in the area to improve enforcement capabilities.
Co-managers have also worked diligently for local economic development. One of the 
greatest successes of the NGOs has been the development o f alternative livelihoods among some
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resource users. Throughout this paper and in Belize more generally, alternative livelihood 
programs are viewed as a mechanism to provide fishermen (or other resource users) with 
alternatives to extractive activities. While these types o f programs may not completely eliminate 
dependence on resource extraction, the goal is to reduce dependence on scarce resources. This 
includes direct employment as rangers or staff, as well as the development o f alternatives to 
resource extraction, such as tourism. There is an understanding amongst all managers that 
marine reserves should not exclude local people, but offer local benefits.
Tourism has been one o f the most popular forms o f alternative livelihood generation. 
FON, TIDE and TASTE, have all provided tour guide and dive guide training as a means to 
generate alternate employment for local people in the tourism industry. TIDE has trained over 15 
fly fishing guides, some of whom work through TIDE Tours, TIDE’S “in house” tourism branch; 
as well as independently or through local resorts. Although these men still fish during tourism ’s 
low season, tour guiding and fly fishing jobs pay significantly more than one day fishing and 
have reduced pressure on fisheries resources. As one fisherman noted, “I f  I  stop  com m ercia l 
fish ing , they w ill have more p ro d u c t to show  the tourists, a n d  tha t w ill be a benefit to me, 
and  to the area, a n d  the c o u n try ” (quoted in Fernandes & Toledo Institute for Development 
and Environment, 2005, p. 44). FON has been intimately involved in the development o f 
procedures for whale shark tourism developing a whale shark tourism course for all guides, 
instituting interaction guidelines and mechanisms for the regulation o f fishing at spawning 
aggregation sites.
These programs have had mixed success. Placencia, with its growing tourism sector, has 
much more demand for tourism based services. Punta Gorda, on the other hand, has had 
difficulty attracting sufficient tourists to employ the number o f trained guides. The Toledo 
District boasts a growing number o f guides, although visitor levels have remained fairly constant 
for the past ten years (Personal Communication, L. Herrera, 2005). In addition, there have been
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complaints about who NGOs are training. Some argue that these jobs should go only to 
stakeholders who have been displaced by the creation o f the reserves. Others have a broader 
view o f who should participate. Although training is valuable, the most disadvantaged often lack 
the financial resources necessary to purchase equipment like boats and gear required to be 
competitive in the tourism industry. Belsky (1999) showed in her study of a coastal community 
in central Belize, that there are many factors affecting community-based tourism initiatives 
including economic status and politics, that may prohibit the truly poor from benefiting from 
tourism. In recognition o f the financial difficulties in acquiring equipment, TIDE and TASTE 
have helped to secure funding for the purchase o f kayaks and snorkel equipment that guides may 
use.
The PHMR provides an example o f the value of involving local people through 
education, employment and training. At first, local fishers opposed the banning o f  gill nets within 
the reserve. TIDE has implemented a number o f programs targeting gill net fishermen and 
successfully garnered community support for the ban, including some fishermen who now 
actively work with TIDE staff to report and prosecute offenders (Fernandes & Toledo Institute for 
Development and Environment, 2005). The general acceptance o f the ban on gill nets has come 
about after a conscientious effort on the part o f TIDE to educate, and provide financial incentives 
such as scholarships and employment for those who had depended upon gill nets for their 
livelihoods (Fernandes & Toledo Institute for Development and Environment, 2005). These 
programs o f education, enforcement and alternative livelihoods have had some successes, and 
most resource users now understand the importance of MPAs and support their use for fisheries 
management and conservation purposes (Personal Communication, L. Garbutt, 2005). In many 
cases, this has translated into community support for MPAs in anticipation of economic 
development through tourism. Although local people may not be unified in their opinions about 
the respective organizations, there is an underlying sense that reserves are serving both
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conservation and local development interests as local people see the possibility for livelihoods 
outside fishing.
Research and Monitoring
Effective management o f marine resources is dependent on clear information about the 
status of the resources, which requires some science. All marine reserves in the country are 
supposed to be staffed with a manager, biologist and at least two rangers. However, turnover is 
high in these positions, which leads to insufficient knowledge, training and experience for 
consistent and effective monitoring and research. When NGOs are involved in management there 
tends to be higher staff retention which can lead to better monitoring (McField, 2000). Some see 
the success of the PHMR and GSMR as linked specifically to the continuity of their staff 
(Personal Communication, J. Gibson, 2005). In addition, the MBRS project and other 
international programs have sponsored training for reserve staff in a wide range o f topics, 
including coral monitoring, socio-economic monitoring, and management effectiveness. These 
trainings have been an excellent resource for co-managers, expanding staff skills to effectively 
monitor important ecosystems and species.
The active involvement and close monitoring o f employees by local NGOs in co­
managed parks has also increased scientific knowledge. NGOs such as FON and TIDE, who 
have delegated authority, are able to hire, monitor and if need be, fire employees. The scientific 
staff at these reserves receive higher salaries attracting more qualified and motivated applicants. 
For example the biologists at both GSMR and PHMR have bachelor’s degrees, while the 
biologist at SCMR only has an associate’s degree. The staff at the Sapodilla Cayes Marine 
Reserve is hired by the Fisheries Department and although they work closely with TASTE, 
TASTE does not supervise them.
In addition, the greater financial resources available at co-managed parks can contribute 
to better science. All three NGOs have secured outside funding to carry out research programs
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within their reserves above those required by Fisheries, including the development of monitoring 
and research plans, some of which incorporate local knowledge (Personal Communication, J. 
Nightingale, 2005; W. Maheia, 2005; L. Garbutt, 2005). Outside donors such as MBRS and the 
Coastal Zone Management Authority and Institute have also worked closely with co-managers to 
ensure that proper protocols and techniques are used in monitoring. FON has worked closely 
with researchers to expand knowledge about whale sharks, and in 2004 TIDE completed a one 
year baseline study o f water quality in the PHMR. Although managers need to take further steps 
to integrate this research and monitoring into the decision making process, these developments 
illustrate a growing ability and interest to use science to improve management practices.
Organizational Capacity
Organizational capacity is a key component of successful co-management in southern 
Belize. Organizational capacity refers to the NGOs ability to manage resources, and includes 
community relations, financing, organizational structure, institutional knowledge and experience. 
The Fisheries Department has been serious about entering into co-management agreements only 
with organizations that have proven capacity for management (Personal Communication, J. 
Azueta, 2005). The Fisheries Department has regarded both TIDE and FON as strong, capable 
organizations, and well prepared for delegated management (Personal Communication, J. Azueta, 
2005). The Fisheries Department has given these two organizations considerable latitude in their 
decision making and management, illustrating their confidence in the organizational capacity. 
TASTE continues to struggle in this area, a fact reflected in its lack o f delegated management 
authority.
To a large extent an organization’s capacity can be linked to the executive director who 
of sets the organization’s agenda and keeps watch over all activities. The role o f the executive 
director is especially important in Belizean society where personal relationships are critical. Both 
TIDE and FON have powerful, locally born leaders. These men are key figures in their
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communities and represent the organization’s goal for local empowerment. The charisma and 
commitment o f these men has allowed their organizations to quickly move forward with 
initiatives.
The role o f the executive director is also important for community relations. TASTE has 
existed from the beginning as an outsider, with its contentious formation and the inclusion o f 
“non-native Belizeans” in key roles. These factors have made it difficult for the organization to 
find local footing and develop effective relationships with donor agencies. TASTE’s complicated 
organizational structure also makes it difficult for stakeholders to understand who is really 
making decisions. Many attribute TASTE’s making slow progress to the fact its lack o f an 
effective local leader (Personal Communication, L. Garbutt, 2005).
The MBRS, along with other international organizations, has sought to build capacity 
among co-management agencies by holding trainings. These trainings have addressed co­
management, board responsibilities, accounting and other management issues and are believed to 
have been beneficial; most local NGO staff are now considered well trained and informed about 
their roles and responsibilities (Personal Communication, J. Gibson, 2005). This is not 
necessarily the case o f local community members and stakeholders who, as noted earlier, are 
often unclear o f their roles in management decision making (Personal Communication, V. Jacobs, 
2005).
The value of local directors is notable in their ability to attract investment. Finances are 
an important aspect o f marine reserve conservation and one o f the key reasons for implementation 
of co-management. All o f the local NGOs involved in co-management have been able to attract 
funds to their respective reserves, some with greater success than others. The executive directors 
o f both FON and TIDE have been very successful at wooing international donors, have received 
funding from private individuals as well as donor agencies, and boast annual budgets o f over US$
500,000 (Personal Communication, L. Garbutt, 2005; Personal Communication, W. Maheia). 
TASTE has not been as successful, but has secured project grants and continues to expand its
46
funding base. The reputation and charisma o f the executive directors has been a major reason for 
TIDE and FON’s financial success with international donor organizations (Fernandes & Toledo 
Institute for Development and Environment, 2005).
Local Power and Politics
The devolution o f power from Belize City to locally based NGOs has allowed them to 
become powerful political forces both in local and national contexts. NGO’s may not have direct 
power over policy on a national level, but they have developed a great deal o f power within their 
communities and the conservation world. They have also become an economic resource for local 
community members. This can be very beneficial to local communities. However, it also can 
cause friction between community members and NGOs, as well as between the different NGOs 
themselves.
Both FON and TIDE are large organizations which employ a substantial number o f local 
people. This not only provides jobs but much needed money as well. TIDE has been involved in 
community activities sponsoring local festivals, sporting events, supporting schools and other 
fundraising events (Personal Communication, W. Maheia, 2005). These activities make a huge 
impression on local people. Many Toledo residents are grateful for TIDE’S programs which have 
provided training and jobs (Fernandes & Toledo Institute for Development and Environment, 
2005).
There is an undercurrent o f competition and conflict between the three NGOs. This can 
be a sensitive issue, as FON, TIDE and TASTE operate in close contact with one another within a 
very small country. This competition affects how each o f the organizations goes about its daily 
activities. As one local conservationist noted, much o f Toledo has been divided into small 
“fiefdoms” (DeVries et al., 2003). Local areas are heavily influenced by NGO activities, and 
there is a considerable overlap between organizations. Both TIDE and TASTE serve virtually the 
same communities, and where their territory stops, FON’s begins. This can create conflict and
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drastically affect how agendas are carried out. Many times TASTE has had difficulty working 
with some of the more northern communities due to growing expectations based on TIDE’S 
strategies (Personal Communication, J. Nightingale, 2005). In addition, there is increasing 
community fatigue as community members are constantly attending meetings and consultations 
(Personal Communication, L. Garbutt, 2005). Most NGOs relying upon an overlapping core of 
key stakeholders and participants who often feel over burdened, while those who have not been 
invited to participate feel excluded. There is growing recognition by the NGOs themselves that 
greater collaboration and cooperation between organizations is needed (Personal Communication, 
W. Maheia, 2005). But, this would mean sharing power and authority, which is not readily given.
The executive directors of FON, TIDE and TASTE, with their extensive international 
donor connections and backing from the government and local communities, have taken charge of 
their organizations and helped to set the conservation agenda for Belize. They have lobbied for 
the creation o f parks, become vocal participants in policy discussions, and contributed to the 
structure o f local development. This gives some people in southern Belize a strong voice in the 
national context.
Over the years community members have watched local NGOs grow into strong 
bureaucratic organizations much like the Belizean government. The NGOs role as a 
representative o f local communities and their limited accountability make many uneasy (DeVries 
et ah, 2003). Community members are often as alienated from the decision making processes of 
local NGOs as the government. As one executive director noted, the role o f the NGO and 
executive director have become similar to that o f a politician (Personal Communication, L. 
Garbutt, 2005). Just as there are complaints about corruption in government, it is not uncommon 
to hear local people complaining about how much money NGOs make and how they spend it. I 
attended a number o f meetings while working with TASTE where local fishermen spoke 
adamantly about how TASTE was making millions o f dollars and not spending anything on the 
reserve (Personal Observation). In addition, there are concerns that NGOs play favorites, giving
48
certain people or communities advantages while overlooking others. Many community members 
have pointed out that it seems like certain families are given preference for trainings and 
employment opportunities (Personal Observation). The three NGOs have been forced to navigate 
and negotiate complex relationships and their growing power can strain community and 
governmental relations, and create new problems for co-managers.
The general perception amongst Belizean community members and government officials 
is that co-management is the preferred mechanism for management and co-managers are for the 
most part doing good work. For example, the village chairman of Placencia indicated that co­
management allows marine reserves to incorporate the diverse needs o f government and the local 
people and said “Co-management is the only way to go” (Personal Communication, G. Eiley, 
2005). The government acknowledges that these NGOs have greater knowledge about local 
issues than they do, and that one o f their major strengths is the ability to raise awareness about 
management issues through education and community involvement (Personal Communication, J. 
Azueta, 2005). A study by McField (2000) found that those MPAs managed by NGOs were 
significantly more effective than those managed by the government alone, although at that time 
none of the MPAs studied were under co-management with the Fisheries Department. McField 
supported the development of more co-managed marine protected areas as a solution not only to 
funding issues but also for more effective management (McField, 2000). This does not mean that 
there are not problems and controversies surrounding these organizations or their management 
strategies. However, these complaints are tempered by the realization that before these 
organizations became involved, the marine resources of the region were not being effectively 
managed.
As co-managers continue to work at local levels to improve management there are many 
areas where they have seen success. Local NGOs have succeeded in educating local people about 
the role of marine reserves and have provided alternative livelihoods. These NGOs are 
expanding the use of sound science in management decision making. NGOs have also given
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many local people an important voice in the national debate over marine conservation. Despite 
these successes, local NGOs still need to better incorporate local people in the decision making 
process and improve accountability. In the next section I explore how these NGOs are influenced 
by broader national and international economic and political forces.
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MPA Management in the National Context
Some o f the broad goals behind protected area co-management include: greater 
community participation, local empowerment, better management, and economic development 
(Borrini-Feyerabend, 1996). As indicated above, many of the local NGOs in southern Belize 
incorporate these goals into marine reserve management plans and efforts. However, there are 
areas over which local co-managers have little influence. These include issues o f power and 
control, financial resources, and national politics. In this section I evaluate how these factors 
affect co-management o f marine reserves.
The battle for power and management control is one o f the biggest constraints to effective 
management. This struggle takes place at a number of levels and includes the local community 
members, Belizean NGOs, different government agencies, and international funders. Belize’s 
increasing financial constraints have contributed to this power struggle. The government lacks 
money for effective management leaving local NGOs to bear much o f the fundraising 
responsibility. There is also a lack o f effective policy for regulating some of the main threats to 
marine conservation. This “missing” policy is not due to lack o f concern, but arises due to a lack 
of political will to tackle controversial issues (Personal Communication, I. Fairweather-Morrison, 
2005). Even in cases where sufficient policy exists, there is often weak enforcement and poor 
interagency support.
The issues of power, financial resources, and national political forces have affected the 
ability o f co-managers to make effective conservation and MPA management decisions. There 
have been a number of high profile cases which have highlighted the influence o f these factors on 
co-management in southern Belize and across the nation. Recent deals with Carnival Cruise Line 
and other international developers have highlighted the need for greater transparency and 
guidelines to balance the needed investment with national strategies for conservation and 
development. In addition the current status o f the Coastal Zone Management Authority and
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Institute highlights the potential o f cross-sectoral cooperation and the limitations o f these 
initiatives without proper financial and governmental support. These examples further illustrate 
the need to incorporate local, national and international factors when approaching co­
management of marine resources.
Power and Control
Marine ecosystems make important contributions to the Belizean economy through both 
tourism and fisheries. The protection of fish stocks and healthy coral reefs is critical to the 
success of these industries. This has led to the declaration of marine reserves across the country. 
Many of these marine reserves were based on Hoi Chan, the first designated marine reserve in 
Belize. Understanding how Hoi Chan was planned and managed offers insight into relationships 
between the Fisheries Department and co-managers at other reserves. The co-management 
experience today has been largely shaped by the experiences at Hoi Chan and many of the 
strategies implemented there have been transferred to later reserves. The centralized power 
arrangement first tested at Hoi Chan have been playing out in southern reserves and FON, TIDE 
and TASTE have had to negotiate and challenge their roles within that system.
The History o f  MPA Power and Control
The first marine reserve in Belize, created by the Fisheries Department in 1987, was Hoi 
Chan Marine Reserve (HCMR) located off San Pedro, Ambergris Caye. The reserve was 
declared after local fishermen, tour guides, and conservationists expressed concern about 
dwindling fish stocks, increasing tourism development, and general degradation to the marine 
ecosystem (Carter, Gibson, Carr III, & Azueta, 1994). The planning process for Hoi Chan was 
supported by the Wildlife Conservation Society and in comparison to later reserves, was 
extensive involving community consultations, as well as biological studies of the area. What 
emerged from the planning process was a management plan that balanced community interests
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and biological needs. In addition, once the reserve was declared, grants from WWF and USAID 
provided for the first three years o f management operation.
Hoi Chan is located close to the tourist town o f San Pedro and the reserve is the most 
visited MPA in the country, with over 85,000 visitors in 2004 (Belize Tourism Board, 2005c). 
The reserve is managed directly by the Fisheries Department, but management funding is secured 
through entrance fees deposited into an independent trust fund. High visitation has allowed the 
reserve to become financially self-sufficient (Young & Bilgre, 2002). HCMR’s proximity to San 
Pedro not only facilitates tourism but also allows easy access for patrol and monitoring. The 
local community has been involved from the beginning with planning and enforcement. San 
Pedro also has received substantial economic benefits from the tourism industry.
The experience o f  Hoi Chan has had a major effect on how marine reserves are designed 
and implemented in Belize. Both the Senior Fisheries Officer and Marine Protected Areas 
Coordinator at the Fisheries Department come from San Pedro and were involved with the 
formation and management o f Hoi Chan. Their experience and expertise have been important for 
the entire structure o f MPA management.
After the success o f Hoi Chan new marine reserves were declared in m id-1990.
However, the planning process for these parks was not as comprehensive as for Hoi Chan. At 
Hoi Chan biological as well as sociological influences were taken into account before the reserve 
was created. The majority o f later parks were declared without the careful consideration of local 
community interests, making enforcement and community support more difficult to achieve. 
While many o f these parks seek to protect important ecosystems, most did not incorporate 
extensive biological data and lacked comprehensive management plans. The Sapodilla Cayes is a 
good example o f an MPA which lacked appropriate planning. Declared in 1996, on-site staff was 
not hired until 2000 and despite continued efforts the park still lacks a functioning legal 
management plan that incorporates social and biological data.
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While Belize had developed a formal system o f marine reserves, at the end o f the 1990’s 
most lacked effective management. Faced with similar management problems across an 
extensive protected area system the Forest Department immediately embraced co-management. 
The Forest Department has been actively engaged in various forms o f co-management for the past 
thirty years, first informally with BAS and now formally with a wide range of different 
organizations. These types o f arrangements were adopted for a variety o f reasons including a 
lack o f training, funding and capacity for effective management (Personal Communication, L. 
Garbutt, 2005). In contrast the Fisheries Department was much slower to develop co­
management agreements for its marine reserves.
Unlike the Forest Department which lacked trained staff, the Fisheries Department 
possessed a well trained and educated staff capable and willing to do marine reserve management 
(Personal Communication, J. Azueta, 2005). It was not until the signing of the MOU with TIDE 
in 2001 that co-management became an official policy for marine reserves managed by the 
Fisheries Department. Some informants indicated that the hesitance to adopt co-management by 
the Fisheries Department was due to the history o f marine reserve management at Hoi Chan, and 
a lack o f interest on the part o f the Department to give up management power in other reserves 
(Personal Communication, J. Gibson, 2005). The circumstances at Hoi Chan; community 
support, close proximity to a important population and tourism center, skilled staff and financial 
security allowed effective management o f the reserve by the Fisheries Department with its own 
resources and skills. It is not surprising that the majority of co-management agreements signed 
in recent years have involved reserves located in the Southern part o f the country, further from 
Fisheries’ centralized base in Belize City. In co-management agreements, the Fisheries 
Department has wanted to be much more in control o f the decision making process than the 
Forest Department. This approach has frequently caused tensions between government and co­
management partners (Personal Communication, L. Garbutt, 2005). It is also important to note 
that even though Forestry and Fisheries have approached co-management in very different ways,
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there is considerable overlap in jurisdiction, with Forestry having authority over a number of 
National Parks protecting marine areas, such as Laughing Bird National Park and Blue Hole 
National Park. The relationship and responsibilities of NGOs, like FON and TIDE which manage 
parks in cooperation with the Forest Department, is much different than that between NGOs and 
the Fisheries Department. In most cases, the Forest Department has surrendered control of 
decisions to the co-management partner, unlike Fisheries which has tried to assert authority over 
co-managers.
The example set by HCMR has had both positive and negative effects on co-management 
o f marine reserves in Belize. Hoi Chan illustrated that MPA management can benefit 
conservation and the local economy. It also provided a training ground for MPA managers. The 
success o f Hoi Chan prompted Belize to create an extensive system of reserves to protect the 
Belize Barrier Reef. Thus, the experiences gained at Hoi Chan shaped marine reserve 
management through out the country. While there have been a number o f benefits to using Hoi 
Chan as a model for later reserves, many of the factors contributing to the success o f Hoi Chan 
are unique and not necessarily transferable to other locations. Hoi Chan’s community driven 
planning, high visitation, easy access, financial independence and sound biological foundation; 
are not found at most other reserves. In addition Hoi Chan is not a co-managed park: all decision 
making comes from a centralized authority. Hoi Chan served as a model for other reserves, but 
its unique situation contributed to the Fisheries Department recognition o f co-management as an 
alternative means o f reserve administration in a diverse MPA system.
Effects on Southern Co-management
The Fisheries Department’s adoption o f delegated co-management provides insight into 
its view o f what co-management is and can bring to the table. Co-management offers the 
possibility for better resource management through the incorporation of resource users into the 
decision making process (Borrini-Feyerabend, Pimbert, Farvar, Kothari, & Renard, 2004).
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Although there is great support for co-management in southern Belize, community involvement 
was not the only reason for the government’s interest in it. The Fisheries Department had 
training and capacity, a fact they had proven at Hoi Chan, but lacked funds to effectively manage 
a large protected areas system (Personal Communication, J. Azueta, 2005). With this in mind, 
Fisheries was interested in partnering with local organizations which not only had proven 
community ties, but also a demonstrated record o f fundraising. In addition, delegated authority 
most closely followed the power structures developed at HCMR.
The first organization to be given delegated co-management for a marine reserve is the 
Toledo Institute for Development and Environment (TIDE) which serves as an excellent example 
o f the qualities the Department o f Fisheries was looking for in co-management partners. It had 
fairly good community relations, a proven commitment to conservation and management and 
perhaps most importantly, a well known backer (TNC) who could provide funding support. The 
agreement that the Fisheries Department signed with TIDE is evidence o f  their confidence not 
only in TIDE’s ability to manage the area, but also to secure funding for that management. The 
situation was similar for Friends o f Nature. TASTE however presents a much different picture, 
as it had no experience, history or funding to support its interest in management.
The Department o f Fisheries has explained its rationale for how co-management 
agreements have been designed as “taking capacity into account” (Personal Communication, J. 
Azueta, 2005). The idea o f “taking capacity into account” implies that the Fisheries Department 
considers the history and capability o f each organization before signing an agreement. This 
included looking at the NGO’s community base, funding availability, history and management 
experience. Using capacity as a measure has meant that every organization entering into co­
management with the Department o f Fisheries has a unique agreement which takes into 
consideration its attributes and unique circumstances.
When evaluating the agreements between Fisheries and FON, TIDE and TASTE, it is 
clear that the confidence the Department had in each organization varied. TIDE was initially
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given full delegated authority for PHMR. This confidence was similar for FON at Gladden Spit. 
TASTE, on the other hand, was initially only given collaborative authority with the Department 
o f Fisheries taking the lead for management. Collaborative management meant that TASTE 
would take the lead in community outreach programs, while Fisheries would retain control over 
day-to-day reserve operations. This authority has since changed, with TASTE now assuming the 
lead role; however, TASTE still does not have day-to-day management control. The precedents 
set by TIDE and FON have influenced how NGOs and the Fisheries Department interact.
The perception by the Fisheries Department that they had management skills but not the 
financial resources affected how co-management evolved. Co-management agreements initiated 
for finances can limit community involvement. In this type o f co-management the emphasis is 
more on the capacity o f the co-management organization to bring funding, rather than the 
community, to the table. This puts co-managers in an awkward position in terms o f power 
relations. This fact has been bom out in southern Belize as local NGOs have proven their ability 
to secure funds, but often face difficulties keeping the community involved.
In the agreements with TIDE and FON, the Fisheries Department plays little role. TIDE 
only receives authority from Fisheries; they are completely funded through non-governmental 
sources. FON receives a few salaries from the Department, but for the most part is autonomous. 
TASTE on the other hand is dependent upon the Fisheries Department for staffing and 
equipment. This gives them little control over on the ground management, including the hiring 
and direction of staff. This lack o f control over day-to-day activities partially explains why the 
management at Sapodilla Cayes is the weakest o f the three parks considered in this study 
(Personal Communication, M. McField, 2005). Although TASTE is located near the reserve and 
has been building its resources, TASTE does not pay the reserve staff. This means it has limited 
authority to dictate when and how management activities are carried out. It is important to note 
however, that the SCMR is still considered better managed than reserves run entirely by the 
Fisheries Department (Personal Communication, J. Nightingale, 2005).
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Problems inherent in the delegated co-management approach are evident in the 
statements by members o f the Department and Belizean NGO community. The Fisheries 
Department often views co-managers as unaware o f their role and the authority o f the government 
(Personal Communication, J. Azueta, 2005). Delegated authority gives the NGO control over 
almost every aspect o f management. It is the delegated manager’s responsibility to implement 
specified management plans which are written and passed into law as guidelines for decision 
making. In the case o f TIDE and FON, the Fisheries Department is rarely involved in the 
decision making process. For these organizations, the Department is involved in situations where 
Fisheries law has been violated. The Department authorizes fisheries officers and prosecutes 
offenders. These local NGOs are therefore acting on behalf o f the Department in day-to-day 
management activities. Not only are they responsible for these activities, but TIDE actually funds 
all of them through grants, donations and other means. In this situation there is little reason or 
interest on behalf o f the NGO to consult the Department. There is some feeling o f resentment by 
Department staff that while delegated co-management has been financially beneficial, it has 
resulted in an unwanted loss o f authority (Personal Communication, J. Azueta, 2005). According 
to those involved in delegated co-management, this led to reluctance on the part o f the 
Department to engage in true dialogue about administrative activities, leaving the two partners 
operating with little communication.
Collaborative managers, such as TASTE, face the same communication problems as 
delegated managers, but for a different reason. TASTE has been responsible for outreach 
activities, including environmental education, alternative livelihood projects and infrastructure 
development. The organization has been largely denied authority over staff, day-to-day activities 
and enforcement. This creates a situation where TASTE has the desire, but not the authority, to 
direct activities at the reserve. TASTE is in a very difficult position. It is heavily dependent on 
the government, but the government has limited faith in their capacity mostly due to TASTE’s 
limited ability to attract funds. The Fisheries Department’s lack o f confidence in TASTE’s
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management can also be attributed to its relatively weak executive director and smaller staff, as 
many in the Department view TASTE as lacking the capacity for management (Personal 
Communication, J. Azueta, 2005). Although TASTE may have more ties in the community and 
be more aware o f what is going on locally and at the reserve, decisions and authority come from 
the Fisheries Department in Belize City. This leaves the organization with little say in how 
monies are spent, who is hired, or how things are done at the reserve. TASTE is in nearly 
constant contact with both on-site staff and the Department, but often decisions are made without 
TASTE’s knowledge or consent. This type of co-management has not been as effective as it 
could be due to a lack o f clear communication and/or power sharing between the partners.
The precedent and history o f Hoi Chan has affected marine reserve development and 
management throughout Belize. From the start HCMR was run independently by the Fisheries 
Department. This system centralized power and made the shared power of co-management 
arrangements difficult. This has placed the Fisheries Department and local NGOs at odds. As 
one observer remarked, “NGOs are contemptuous and pay lip service to working with the GOB” 
(Personal Communication, W. Jones, 2005). This type o f attitude has made both NGOs and the 
government wary of each other and encouraged them to cling to whatever power they have. For 
organizations like TASTE who lack delegated authority, it has been difficult to negotiate an 
alternative path. As a consequence, delegated authority has emerged as the only way for co­
managers to exert real control. This struggle over power will continue as long as there is a lack o f 
clarity as two how power is shared.
Financial Resources
The country o f Belize currently confronts financial crisis. As the government and the 
country face mounting debt, tough decisions will have to be made about allocation o f financial 
resources. Since 1998 the proportion o f debt to GDP has risen from 41% to 93%, putting Belize 
in the same category as other highly indebted Caribbean countries (Sahay, 2005). Debt has risen
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despite economic growth, and is largely explained by poor spending choices and the ease of 
borrowing (The Economist, 2004). As external debt mounts conservation interests receive less 
financial support than they need, and there is increasing pressure to look elsewhere for funding. 
Lack o f money for the Fisheries Department forced them to turn to co-managers for financial 
contributions. This has increased the power o f both local non-governmental organizations and 
international donors. A lack o f secure finances is one o f the major constraints to effective reserve 
management for both government and co-managers alike.
Fisheries Department Finances
The government’s financial crisis has had a profound effect on the Fisheries Department. 
Although the budget for the Department has grown in recent years it is still woefully inadequate 
for managing 8 marine reserves and enforcing Fisheries laws throughout the country. During the 
2002/2003 fiscal year 88% of the fisheries budget went to salaries and a small fraction went to 
other overhead, leaving less than 10% o f the budget for all other activities including enforcement, 
fuel and research (Government o f Belize, 2003d). This changed in 2004/2005 with more than 
32% of the budget going to the operational expenses necessary for management (Government o f 
Belize, 2005). Even though the budget increased by over 66% in that two year period, shortages 
o f staff, fuel and equipment plague every reserve in the system (Government o f Belize, 2003d, 
2005). In response, the Department has started to depend upon co-managers and outside agencies 
for funding. The Fisheries Department relied upon a grant o f almost US$ 50,000 for a crucial 
conch monitoring project (Personal Communication, P. Morgan, 2005). As the needs for 
effective MPA management and financial pressures grow, there is concern about how reserves 
will be financed and resources protected.
The growing recognition o f financial problems was addressed in 2003 when the Coastal 
Zone Management Authority and Institute (CZMAI) outlined ways to create more sustainable 
financing for MPA management. The report proposed fee collection and grant support as major
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financing mechanisms (Coastal Zone Management Authority and Institute, 2003a). The CZMAI 
strategy estimates that the cost of effective management of the MPA system at over US$
2,500,000 yearly (Coastal Zone Management Authority and Institute, 2003a). The total budget 
for the Fisheries Department in 2004-05 was less than US$ 250,000 for all activities (the Forest 
Department currently does not have any funds for MPA management) and financing for MPA 
management was a fraction o f what is needed (Government o f Belize, 2005).
Generated after broad stakeholder consultations, the CZMAI report emphasizes the 
importance o f instituting effective financing measures for MPA management as quickly as 
possible (Coastal Zone Management Authority and Institute, 2003a). This urgency is due in part 
to the fact that the CZMAI project funding was to close in 2004, and recognition of the need for 
broad based, cross-sectoral funding links to maintain the integrity o f the MPA system (Coastal 
Zone Management Authority and Institute, 2003a).
The need to finance MPA management has led the Fisheries Department to implement 
some of the recommendations o f the CZMAI report. Late in 2004 the Department instituted a 
uniform entry fee for all marine reserves in the protected areas system. Daily entrance fees were 
set at US$ 10 per non-Belizean visitor for all parks managed by the Fisheries Department. 
Implementation o f the fee system has been marked by controversy with no published policy 
explaining how monies collected through this system will be distributed. The current 
understanding is that fees will be deposited into a MPA trust fund as per the CZMAI 
recommendation (Personal Communication, J. Nightingale, 2005). Flowever, it is currently 
unclear who will be responsible for the management of this account. The money in the fund will 
be used for reserve management, with most of the fees collected remaining for on site 
management. A small percentage of the money raised will be withheld for reserves with low 
visitation and Fisheries Department overhead. The idea is that reserves which generate excess 
money will be able to support others. However, even though the fees are now being collected the 
logistics o f the system remain unclear.
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The collection o f visitor fees worked very well at Hoi Chan and serves as a model for this 
new system (Personal Communication, J. Azueta, 2005). However, as mentioned above, Hoi 
Chan is in a unique situation. Hoi Chan receives a large number o f foreign visitors and all 
monies are deposited into a trust fund which is managed by a separate board o f trustees. In the 
new system it is unclear who will make decisions about how the MPA funds will be distributed. 
Reserves like PHMR that receive very few visitors (less than 700 a year) will likely never be 
sustainable solely from entrance fees, and may gain from the surplus funds in this arrangement. 
Mangers of more heavily visited reserves have expressed fear that funds management solely by 
the government could lead to confusion and misconduct (Personal Communication,, J. 
Nightingale, 2005). The return o f visitor fees for management could benefit all reserves, but the 
ambiguity o f the system makes it unclear who will control the money and how it will come back 
to reserves for management.
In southern Belize response to the new fee system has varied. Because FON had been 
collecting fees in collaboration with the Forest Department prior to the implementation of this 
program, they have been involved in early discussions about how the accounting system for the 
new fee system should be set up (Personal Communication, J. Azueta, 2005). In addition, at 
Gladden Spit FON collects fees from whale shark tourists. On the other hand, TIDE who receives 
nothing from the Fisheries Department has made it clear that they do not intend to return the 
money they collect to the Department, but keep it for management (Personal Communication, W. 
Maheia, 2005). This move illustrates TIDE’s view o f the Department’s financial management, 
and their position of power in relation to the Fisheries Department.
Currently TASTE and the SCMR are in a potentially perilous position with regards to the 
new fee system. Due to its status as a collaborative, rather than delegated manager, TASTE is not 
in a strong bargaining position. There are also historic problems with fee collection at the SCMR. 
While fee collection began in November o f 2004 for all other reserves, collection was not passed 
over to SCMR staff until January 2005. This was due to an agreement that gave the Belize
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Tourism Board (BTB) the right to collect fees at the SCMR. In fact the SCMR and HCMR were 
the only marine reserves collecting fees prior to November 2004. Until January 2005, money was 
collected by a BTB representative and all funds were used by BTB for their own purposes, with 
little returned for reserve management (Personal Communication, J. Nightingale, 2005). The 
SCMR is in a unique position because it receives heavy visitation from Guatemalans and 
Hondurans who have historically used the cayes as a vacation spot. The fact that fees have long 
been collected at the SCMR has made the transition to the new system much smoother than at 
other reserves. However, past enforcement of the fee system at the SCMR was characterized by 
impropriety with fees being waived in exchange for bribes and ineffective accounting, and 
community members have voiced concerns about how the new rules are being enforced (Personal 
Communication, V. Jacobs, 2005). TASTE has also expressed concerns about how fees will be 
put back into the reserve, with the Executive Director viewing fees as the primary means of 
financial sustainability (Personal Communication, J. Nightingale, 2005).
The lack o f consistent funding for the Fisheries Department has limited its ability to 
effectively manage the Marine Protected Areas system. This has led the Fisheries Department to 
search for methods beyond the government budget to fund activities. The implementation o f the 
fee system could provide more stable and sustainable financing for the system. However, the 
lack o f transparency and collaboration between the Department and NGOs engaged in co­
management, has lead to conflict over how the new fee collection system has been implemented 
and how funds are allocated.
Project Funding
As the Fisheries Department explores ways to remain fiscally solvent, funding is one o f 
the major benefits to signing co-management agreements. The CZMAI (2003a) report indicated 
that 78% of investment costs, i.e. infrastructure and equipment, will be provided through co­
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management partners in 2004. This highlights the benefits and ability o f Belizean NGOs to raise 
funds for management projects.
In many cases, donor organizations have prohibitions against giving money directly to 
government agencies. The use o f co-management partners allows monies to be given for park 
management through local NGOs, not government. In addition, the co-manager’s community 
relationships are often attractive to donor agencies looking to show that their money is going to 
community based initiatives. Large funding agencies, including The Nature Conservancy, 
Conservation International, and World Wildlife Fund, have given extensively to the three local 
organizations working on MPA management in Southern Belize. There have also been projects 
by foreign government and intergovernmental organizations such as the World Bank, United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP), United Nations Education, Social and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) and US Agency for International Development (USAID). These 
international organizations all have interest in projects with direct community, economic and 
conservation effects.
A good example o f the types o f grant programs that have been available for co-managers
is the Community Management for Protected Areas Conservation (COMPACT) project
implemented by UNDP. The project’s stated purpose was:
To promote and finance sustainable livelihood approaches and other community level 
interventions so as to reduce threats to the Belize Barrier R ee f Reserve System  - World 
Heritage Site (BBRRS-WHS) (Naturalight Productions Ltd., 2006, 1)
This was accomplished through grants to organizations up to US$ 50,000 for the implementation 
o f a wide range o f community projects that would improve biodiversity conservation. Both 
Friends o f Nature and TASTE received grants through this project. FON used the funds to train 
local people as SCUBA dive masters and to create an artificial dive site near Laughing Bird Caye. 
TASTE used the funding to develop its outreach and education program and gave almost 600
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local students the opportunity to learn about and experience the SCMR. All in all, the 
COMPACT project awarded close to half a million dollars for projects directed at BBRRS-WHS.
Typically, large donor organizations such as UNDP or USAID have made funds available 
to co-managers through programs with targeted goals and objectives. While these types of 
“project based” initiatives have been beneficial to management, they have not always served local 
organizations in the best possible way. Project based funding offers one time funding for an 
initiative, be it environmental education or monitoring. Although donor institutions often 
emphasize sustainability, these types o f projects are always temporally limited. This leaves local 
groups either to abandon the effort at the end o f the project period, or attempt to secure further 
funding to continue the project. Project funding can also ignore key financial needs o f small local 
organizations, such as administrative costs and overhead. Communication between international 
donors and local NGOs is often focused more on what donors can offer than what local NGOs 
need, and there is often a lack o f constructive dialogue between donors and NGOs as to their real 
needs and desires (Personal Communication, I. Fairweather-Morrison, 2005)
International funders are often hesitant to provide funds outside o f major project 
initiatives. Some of these initiatives, such as the MBRS project are locally based with a solid 
understanding o f the needs o f the region. However, the agendas of donors are not set by local 
people or grant recipients. It has often been the case that money becomes available for specific 
projects or perceived threats. These types of projects may or may not be what is really needed for 
improved management. In recent years education, alternative livelihoods, management 
effectiveness and capacity building have been major interests of donor agencies. Although 
valuable, these initiatives often do not address what co-managers have identified as constraints to 
effective resource conservation.
TASTE is a prime example o f the pitfalls o f project based funding. For the past four 
years TASTE has relied almost entirely on project funding. Although TASTE has implemented a 
number o f successful projects (including two COMPACT projects), they have struggled to meet
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administrative costs. Without reliable funding to maintain administrative costs, TASTE has been 
less successful than other Belizean NGOs in the region (Personal Communication, J. Nightingale, 
2005). This lack o f effectiveness has been linked to a sort o f circular logic used by donors and 
the Fisheries Department. The Fisheries Department’s requirement for “capacity”, as evidenced 
by a funding track record, is one reason for not giving delegated control to TASTE. But the lack 
o f management control has been one o f the main reasons given to the Executive Director o f 
TASTE for the lack o f donor interest in the organization (Personal Communication, J. 
Nightingale, 2005). Insufficient administrative monies can have large effects. Since so much of 
Belizean politics and decision making takes place on a one-on-one, face-to-face basis, a lack o f 
administrative and travel funds has limited TASTE’s ability to participate in key meetings and 
visibly demonstrate its commitment to management.
For the Fisheries Department co-management has proven to be a way to pass funding 
responsibility for reserve management to others. This may benefit the reserve system as a whole 
through stretching the limited funds, as well as the reserves in the southern region. The use o f co­
management has provided greater funding for management projects, putting co-managed parks in 
a better position than those managed solely by the Fisheries Department. Independent funding 
has also allowed managers to pursue community centered projects. However, much o f the 
funding has been limited to specific projects and does not sustain consistent management. For 
FON, TIDE and TASTE, outside funding has helped them gain community and governmental 
support for co-management, but it has been insufficient for day-to-day management needs.
International Donor Agencies
Amongst the conservation community in southern Belize it is understood that 
international support is key to financing natural resource management (DeVries et al., 2003). 
However, international conservation organizations have their own agendas, which may or may 
not converge with the local organizations they fund. The dominance o f international
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organizations is evident in that they can overpower local organizations with both money and 
political power. Local NGOs in need of financing and support often quick overlook some of these 
issues and only later realizing how dominating these international organizations can be.
Both TIDE and FON relied on support from donor agencies to provide initial financial 
security and international credibility. Although most people in the region do not want to 
acknowledge the importance of these relationships, it seems clear that TIDE (and FON) would 
not have been successful without the support of international organizations (DeVries et al., 2003). 
TASTE has lacked consistent international support. The Executive Director o f TASTE has made 
many efforts to secure funding, including pursuing non-traditional routes such as corporate 
sponsorship, but with little success. It is possible that TIDE and FON’s charismatic and powerful 
local leaders have made them more attractive to international donors. Having an international 
organization to stand behind initiatives gives provides credibility and negotiating power in Belize 
and valuable global recognition.
TIDE’S history with the Nature Conservancy (TNC) illustrates of how international 
donors can dominate local conservation efforts. TIDE and TNC have been linked since TIDE’S 
formation in 1997 (DeVries et al., 2003). Many local people (and other local NGOs) have had a 
hard time distinguishing between the activities o f the two organizations. TIDE has tried to 
actively characterize itself apart from TNC. However, even now, with TNC contributing only 
about 10% of TIDE’S general budget, it is assumed within the conservation community that TNC 
has supported TIDE to the exclusion o f other local groups (Personal Communication, W. Maheia, 
2005; Personal Communication, J. Nightingale, 2005). These relationships can be damaging in 
the way that they blur the distinction between local and international interests.
International organizations are often quick to support so called community driven 
programs, neglecting to fully evaluate whether this type o f intervention is appropriate or even 
warranted (Chapin, 2004). Ravndal (2002) analyzed a UNDP/GEF grant implemented to 
improve community co-managed parks in Belize. He observed that many of the local
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organizations given money for park management were not capable o f carrying out the activities o f 
the grant (Ravndal, 2002). In addition to their lack o f capacity, there were a number of 
unforeseen constraints that ultimately led to project failures (Ravndal, 2002). Many of the 
southern NGOs have more structure and administrative capacity than Community Based 
Organizations (CBOs) involved in the UNDP/GEF project (Ravndal, 2002). This is especially 
true of those NGOs involved in MPA management, as capacity was a major consideration when 
co-management agreements were designed. Although the greater capacity o f local NGOs has 
provided security to donor agencies, community participation may not be as important to local 
NGOs as CBOs. This calls into question the extent to which support is actually going to 
communities as many international organizations intend.
Another outcome o f dependence on international funding has been competition between 
local groups for donor attention and money. This has sometimes created animosity and battles 
over turf (DeVries et al., 2003). FON, TIDE and TASTE all work in close proximity, on similar 
projects, with limited resources. Although all three have slightly different needs and strategies, 
they all depend on outside sources for funds. This dependence can translate into conflict when 
multiple NGOs seek to work with a finite number o f donor agencies. A clear example o f this 
conflict is evident with TIDE and TASTE. Although working in the same town on similar issues, 
TIDE and TASTE do not collaborate with one another, for historical and other reasons. Both 
organizations profess no ill will towards the other, and the relationship has improved over the 
years. Yet they have little interest in coordinating programs or activities (DeVries et al., 2003).
In the past two years there has been growing recognition o f the need for greater collaboration and 
calls for FON, TIDE and TASTE to amalgamate. Concerns about how a merger might actually 
work has led to hesitancy on all sides.
Despite the importance o f the relationship, many local conservationists are skeptical of 
connections between international interests and local conservation initiatives (Personal 
Communication, L. Garbutt, 2005). International interests change and funding follows these
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priorities. What happens if coral reef conservation and coastal management decline in priority for 
international donors? The possibility that funding could decline is a concern for local 
conservation groups aware o f their precarious position. Some groups seem to have little concern, 
feeling as though their commitment and missions will continue to attract funding from outside 
sources (Personal Communication, W. Maheia, 2005). Others resent the intrusion by 
international groups and their exploitation o f local conservation interests (Personal 
Communication, L. Garbutt, 2005). Whatever happens in the future, it is clear that the role o f 
international funders will continue to be both pivotal and controversial in marine conservation 
initiatives.
A lack o f funds has forced the Fisheries Department as well as local NGOs to look 
elsewhere for money for MPA management. Co-management has provided the government o f 
Belize and the Fisheries Department with a new way to fund marine reserve management. The 
reliance o f most o f marine reserves in southern Belize on outside funding sources has allowed 
them to be more effective in management than if they had relied on the government alone. 
However, the uncertainty o f future funding makes these organizations vulnerable to the changing 
preferences o f international funders. FON, TIDE and TASTE (and southern Belize in general) 
continue to look to tourism as a means for alternative financial support, following in the footsteps 
o f Hoi Chan. Tourism can help to provide funds. However the lack o f financial security in the 
Fisheries Department will likely continue to have a powerful effect on how Belizean NGO co­
managers and the government relate to one another.
National Politics
Belize has long been compared to Costa Rica, a stable, conservation minded democracy 
in the midst of Central American chaos. Although a secure democracy, Belizean politics is 
notoriously unpredictable. This political unrest was highlighted in April 2005 with a ten day 
strike by the teacher’s union in protest o f the 2005/2006 budget. The protest came to a head
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when peaceful demonstrations in Belize City ended in looting. International controversy over the 
sale o f the phone company, accusations o f financial misappropriations, financial sector 
downgrades, and the threat o f currency devaluation herald future challenges for Belize. The 
general population confronts increasing crime, rising cost o f living, and growing unemployment 
(Central Intelligence Agency, 2005). These issues will likely impact how natural resources are 
managed in the future.
The instability o f the current political and economic situation raises questions about the 
government’s ability to make long term decisions for the protection o f natural resources. The 
complexities o f natural resource management, among other factors, are dependent on effective 
governance. The large number o f government organizations involved in environmental 
regulation requires effective cooperation between agencies. It also requires sound laws and 
effective enforcement. The governmental system with its power vested in a hand picked cabinet 
gives a few individuals (and their friends) a great deal o f power. Often politics results in making 
decisions that appease key constituencies or cronies in the short run, sometimes to the detriment 
o f social or economic well-being. Co-managers (and indeed all organizations) must operate 
within this political context which influences their ability to actively plan and manage marine 
resources.
Agency Cooperation
A crucial factor in marine reserve management, and in resource management throughout 
Belize, is inter-agency cooperation. In Belize there are a wide range o f agencies responsible for 
the management o f different resources. Although I have focused on the Fisheries Department, all 
MPAs are affected by other governmental agencies and organizations. For MPA co-management 
this can include the Fisheries Department, the Forest Department, the Department o f the 
Environment, the Coastal Zone Management Authority and Institute, the Belize Tourism Board, 
and a host o f other governmental organizations. This list does not include national, regional and
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local non-governmental organizations and interest groups. Effective management o f resources
requires cooperation between all of these groups, and this cooperation is slow in coming.
The Coastal Zone Management Institute and Authority (CZMAI) was created in
recognition o f the need for greater cooperation between governmental partners. The CZMAI was
established to integrate coastal zone management with the mission to:
support the allocation, sustainable use and planned development o f  Belize's coastal 
resources through increased knowledge and the building o f  alliances fo r  the benefit o f  all 
Belizeans and the global community (Coastal Zone Management Authority and Institute, 
2004,1 5)
The Coastal Zone Management Authority and Institute is divided into two parts: the Authority 
and the Institute. The Authority advises the minister; develops projects, guidelines and the 
Coastal Zone Management Plan; and oversees the Institute (Coastal Zone Management Authority 
and Institute, 2004). The Institute is responsible for scientific research and monitoring (Coastal 
Zone Management Authority and Institute, 2004). All o f these roles as well as the administrative 
structure o f the organization were laid out by the cabinet in the Coastal Zone Management Act.
The CZMAI’s struggle to implement an integrated coastal zone management plan offers 
insight into the difficulties o f interagency cooperation. The idea for the Coastal Zone 
Management Authority was first discussed soon after the creation o f Hoi Chan Marine Reserve. 
The organization was formed in recognition of the need for more comprehensive management o f 
impacts on the Belize Barrier Reef (Carter, Gibson, Carr III, & Azueta, 1994). In 1993 
UNDP/GEF provided funding for the organization and development of an inclusive management 
plan for the entire coastal zone. In 1998 the CZMAI was endorsed by the government with the 
passing o f the Coastal Zone Management Act, which formalized the organization and specified its 
roles and responsibilities. Further funding was provided by UNDP/GEF in 1999 for 
implementation o f the plan. In 2004 this funding expired and CZMAI is currently operating on a 
reduced budget.
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One of the major motivations for the formation o f the CZMAI was the creation o f an 
agency to integrate the numerous government bodies responsible for the coastal region. The 
CZMAI was established under the Department o f Fisheries, Agriculture and Cooperatives. Due 
to the complexities o f authority in the coastal zone CZMAI is required to liaise with the Forest 
Department, Department o f Environment and a number o f other government agencies. The 
Coastal Zone Management Act also created the Coastal Zone Advisory Council which included 
the Fisheries Administrator, Chief Forest Officer, Chief Environmental Officer, Ports 
Commissioner, Commissioner o f Lands, Director o f the Office o f Geology and Petroleum, 
Director o f the Belize Tourism Board, Principal Public Health Officer, Physical Planner in the 
Ministry o f Natural Resources, Housing and Planning Officer, Director o f the University of 
Belize Marine Research Centre as well as two non-governmental representatives (Coastal Zone 
Management Authority and Institute, 2004). Therefore major players from many of the 
governmental organizations were present at meetings and involved in the formation of policies as 
they related to coastal zone management.
The establishment of the CZMAI could have been a way for different sectors to work 
together to discuss trends and develop policy. In fact, the Integrated Coastal Zone Management 
Strategy exists as a comprehensive document that both categorizes the coastal zone and provides 
guidelines for future activities. Even though this document has been prepared and there have 
been successful outcomes from the CZMAI project, its major goal, interagency cooperation, has 
had limited success. The plan has not been ratified by the government, and with the end o f the 
funding cycle in 2004 the activities o f the CZMAI have largely ceased. The basic failure of the 
CZMAI to serve as a mechanism for cross-sectoral cooperation illustrates the challenges faced in 
effective marine resource management.
The colonial history o f logging which relied on use o f Belize’s many rivers and extensive 
coastline, has led to about 45% o f the population living near the coast (Coastal Zone Management 
Authority and Institute, 2001a). The impacts o f human activities are great, and it was the goal of
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the CZMAI to coordinate between agencies and find ways to mitigate and regulate impacts for 
more sustainable use of coastal resources. The Integrated Coastal Zone Management Plan 
addresses: research and monitoring, marine protected areas monitoring, mangrove protection, 
fisheries, aquaculture, caye development, marine pollution, cruise ships, education, enforcement, 
alternative livelihoods and much more. The comprehensive nature o f this plan required careful 
consultation with a wide range o f government agencies, non-governmental organizations, local 
communities and businesses. One o f the former directors of the CZMAI noted that the Advisory 
Council meetings were extremely beneficial as a means for bringing diverse groups together to 
discuss issues facing the coastal region and provided open dialogue about concerns and 
opportunities (Personal Communication, I. Fairweather-Morrison, 2005). In fact, it was 
frequently noted in reviews of the project that the formation o f a strong Advisory Council was 
one o f the major strengths o f the project (Hildebrand, Putney, & Vega, 2005).
Even with the strength o f the CZMAI Advisory Committee and government support, the 
CZMAI had difficulties. There was concern that the CZMAI was limited to advising and 
planning and therefore did not have authority to implement policy, making it difficult to secure 
commitments (Personal Communication, I. Fairweather-Morrison). In 2003 CZMAI held a 
National Coastal Symposium where draft policy documents were presented. These policies 
addressed issues relating to coastal impacts, including cruise tourism, integrated coastal 
management, caye development, aquaculture and more. The conference was attended by 
representatives from government agencies, as well as Belizean non-governmental organizations, 
business interests and scientists. This symposium was an opportunity for a wide range of 
interests to come together and address concerns and ideas for coastal issues. However, there has 
been little action toward implementing many o f the guidelines and policies proposed.
CZMAI was created as an organization to bridge the many government agencies whose 
work affects the coastal region. However, the mandate given by government was insufficient for 
CZMAI to actually implement the plans it helped develop. The implementation of policy and
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enforcement of laws was left to specific government agencies who were often more concerned 
with maintaining their own power (Personal Communication, I. Fairweather-Morrison, 2005). 
Concerns were also expressed by some that the CZM AI favored conservation and was anti­
development (Personal Communication, I. Fairweather-Morrison, 2005). Some of these 
challenges were overcome as relationships developed and government officials were educated 
about the goals of the CZMAI (Personal Communication, I. Fairweather-Morrison, 2005). 
However, cross-sectoral cooperation has been slow, a problem only amplified by the end of 
CZMAI’s funding in 2004.
Without a functioning agency that is able to analyze and synthesize the diverse issues 
facing the coastal zone and the lack o f policy, complex coastal development issues will continue 
to haunt resource managers. Marine reserves across the country are currently attempting to 
balance tourism, development, fisheries management and ecosystem integrity. This is especially 
true in the southern part o f the country where tourism is growing and impacts are starting to be 
felt.
Tourism Planning and Policy Problems
The complexities o f the Belizean ministerial system and the absence of interagency 
cooperation can produce problems with the production and enforcement of policy. In many cases 
there is a marked lack of enforceable regulations and laws to guide decisions. Local NGOs 
engaged in co-management have limited ability to ensure government follows through with 
policies (Personal Communication, G. Ellis, 2005). In most cases this is not due to a lack o f 
awareness or inability to write policy, but to the unwillingness o f politicians to tackle contentious 
issues. Some o f this “missing” policy and enforcement relates to coastal zone management, co­
management, transnational conflict, cruise tourism, caye development, aquaculture, climate 
change, bio-prospecting and many more. I briefly explore some of the policy issues surrounding 
cruise tourism, but it is important to recognize the vast number o f potential impacts on marine
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conservation, many o f which lack policy or planning. The controversial nature o f these issues 
adds to the complexity o f developing and enforcing policy. In this climate, managers are left to 
without comprehensive national strategies or plans.
Tourism is a key economic contributor to the Belizean economy, responsible for about 
23% of GDP (World Travel and Tourism Council, 2004). The relationship between the 
government o f Belize and the tourism industry has shifted dramatically over the past twenty 
years. The government o f George Price and the early PUP condemned tourism as “whorish” 
(Hunt & Higinio, 1993). This rhetoric changed quickly as ecotourism developed into a 
alternative to traditional “sun, sea, sand and sex” tourism (Hunt & Higinio, 1993). For the past 
fifteen years the government o f Belize has promoted tourism as one o f the keys to the country’s 
economic success. The coral reef is one o f the major tourist attractions. Belize has been very 
active in promoting and attracting tourists. Despite these successes, there has been a general 
failure to implement a national tourism policy that balances tourism and its associated 
environmental impacts (Launchpad Consulting & Russell, 2005) The tourism sector has made a 
concerted effort to plan, but there has not been effective movement on the government’s part to 
implement plans or policy for the industry.
In 1998 Belize developed a national strategy for tourism: the Blackstone Report. This 
strategy provided guidelines for how tourism development should take place and included 
recommendations on a wide range of topics as they related to the tourism industry (Blackstone 
Corporation, 1998). It called for moderate growth o f 4% annually over the next five years from 
1998-2003, or approximately 120,000 tourists in 2003, and a focus on natural-cultural tourism 
(Blackstone Corporation, 1998). Belize has not followed this strategy and the rapid growth o f the 
industry has led some to question how the industry is managed and what policies should be in 
place to regulate tourism (Launchpad Consulting & Russell, 2005). The majority o f the visitors 
in 2005 were cruise passengers, a form o f tourism which is barely mentioned in the 1998 National 
Strategy.
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Although currently cruise tourism is concentrated in northern Belize, the current and 
potential impacts of the industry in the north are relevant to southern co-management for a 
number of reasons. For example, there have been talks of developing a cruise port in the southern 
part of the country. The Mayor o f Punta Gorda Town has been working on a proposal for the 
development of a cruise terminal (Personal Communication, C. Galvez, 2005). The port would 
serve smaller ships and is hoped generate income and provide jobs for Toledo residents (Personal 
Communication, C. Galvez, 2005). Already small ships serving 200 passengers occasionally visit 
Punta Gorda and the Sapodilla Cayes. This indicates the growing need for effective policy to 
guide cruise tourism development in the future. In addition, any expansion o f the cruise tourism 
industry could directly affect local NGO development o f eco-tourism initiatives.
I have chosen cruise tourism as an example of the implications o f the lack o f effective 
policy across all sectors. There are a number o f other issues, such as aquaculture and pollution, 
which lack policy and/or enforcement and adversely affect marine reserve co-management. 
However, concerns about cruise tourism impact, both on the economy and environment, provide a 
clear example of how policy and planning are needed for effective management of coastal and 
marine resources. Since the mid-90’s the cruise tourism industry in Belize has increased rapidly. 
When the Blackstone Report was published in 1998 Belize hosted 15,000 cruise visitors. By 
2005 that number had risen to over one million, and although cruise tourism accounted for over 
86% of the visitation in 2003 it only accounted for 14% of the total tourism revenues (Belize 
Tourism Board, 2005b; Launchpad Consulting & Russell, 2005). This dramatic rise in visitation 
over the past seven years has had a number o f impacts on the Belizean tourism industry. The 
most popular cruise tourism attractions are archaeological and natural sites (such as Hoi Chan, 
G o ffs  Caye, the Maya ruins o f Xunantinch and Altun Ha and the Belize Zoo) which makes 
effective management o f both crowds and resources important (Launchpad Consulting & Russell, 
2005). There is growing concern that high visitation during cruise days has adversely impacted 
the environment and endangered Belize’s reputation as an “ecotourism” destination (Launchpad
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Consulting & Russell, 2005). Although the tourism industry has grown, and some regulations 
exist, the rate o f growth has outpaced the ability o f the national strategy or existing tourism laws 
to handle the increase in visitor numbers.
Although cruise tourism may have potential economic benefits, it can also adversely 
impact the environment. Potential effects include pollution and coral reef damage, making the 
establishment o f specific carrying capacities and limits o f acceptable change important. The draft 
cruise tourism policy clearly addresses the need for carrying capacities for protected areas and 
tourism destinations (Coastal Zone Management Authority and Institute, 2003b). It recommends 
that carrying capacities be developed for all natural and cultural sites, taking environmental, 
social and physical factors into account. Carrying capacities can help both tour operators and 
managers better control tourist actions and effects. Despite the recognized need for carrying 
capacities, few of the popular attractions currently have such guidelines or enforce them.
The marine sector is one o f Belize’s major tourism attractions. In 2004 Hoi Chan 
received over 85,000 visitors (Belize Tourism Board, 2005c). Although cruise passengers visit 
only one section o f the reserve, increased tourism pressure has led to concerns about impacts to 
the reef ecosystem. This led Hoi Chan to conduct a study to evaluate tourist’s impacts on the reef 
and how guides were working to reduce them. The study revealed numerous potential 
detrimental effects (i.e. coral breakage, stirring sand, touching animals) and documented the 
importance o f trained and qualified guides to ensure minimal tourist impacts (Paz, Grimshaw, 
McField, & Alamilla, 2003). Although tourist activities did not seem to be negatively affecting 
the reef at present, increased tourism pressures pose future risks.
Hoi Chan is not alone in feeling the impacts from cruise tourism. G o ffs  Caye, a small 
caye off o f Belize City, has become a popular cruise passenger destination with reports o f over 
500 people visiting the caye on crowded days (Coastal Zone Management Authority and Institute, 
2003b). CZMAI is currently working to develop a management plan for this caye (Personal 
Communication, I. Fairweather-Morrison, 2005). It will be important to monitor the impacts o f
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cruise visitors and adjust management strategies to minimize adverse impacts across the marine 
sector.
There are advantages to concentrating tourism in certain areas through zoning. However, 
careful planning is needed to ensure that harmful effects are mitigated. Carrying capacities and 
careful monitoring could be used to help managers make decisions about how to balance 
sometimes conflicting priorities. These decisions require government guidelines and enforceable 
policy, both of which are currently lacking. Government’s focus on revenue generation, although 
understandable given the state of public finances, has overlooked the need for comprehensive 
policy.
For the past few years cruise tourism has been a flash point for concerns about 
environmental protection and development, it is an area where effective policy is desperately 
needed. However, cruise tourism is just one prominent example of where policy has not kept 
pace with on the ground developments. One could make similar arguments for other activities 
like aquaculture, pollution, and bioprospecting that impact the coastal ecosystem and coral reefs. 
All o f these areas like cruise tourism, have seen the development o f draft policies, but lack legal 
guidelines and formal policy. Without enforceable policies local non-governmental organizations 
have limited room to act. Organizations have educated local people about impacts on the reef, 
trained local guides and monitored environmental changes, but they need government support to 
effectively manage Belize’s marine resources. Most importantly, existing laws need to be 
supported and enforced.
Ministerial Power
Politics in Belize are divisive. Clashes between the UDP and PUP can be fierce. While 
there is little philosophical difference between the PUP and UDP, party loyalty runs deep. The 
parliamentary cabinet-based system has allowed dominant party leaders to exert complete control 
over policy. In this climate, politicians are nothing if they are not in control and supporting the
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wining party can have profound benefit. Politically favored villages have electricity and paved 
roads, while those of the opposition loose out. The focus on party unity and clientilism has had a 
huge impact on the direction that Belize has taken in recent years. The public is starting to loose 
confidence in their leaders and feel powerless to affect the decision making process (Personal 
Observation).
Ministers wield considerable power in Belizean politics. As described above, the cabinet 
is the ultimate source of political power. It meets behind closed doors, and there is a tradition o f 
“collective responsibility” which discourages dissent. Members o f the cabinet are always loyal 
members o f the political party in charge, and a common method of party discipline is the granting 
and removal o f cabinet positions. Since Said M usa’s re-election in 2003, his cabinet has changed 
five times, illustrating instability within the country as well as the PUP. The members of the 
cabinet are responsible for the generation of all public policy. In addition, Ministers exercise near 
complete control over the financial resources o f their ministries.
In the Fisheries sector, the Minister has control over marine reserves, enforcement of 
Fisheries Law, and issuing o f permits. One of the most controversial aspects o f this control is the 
degree o f ministerial discretion over reserve managers. If the Fisheries Minister decides that 
reserve boundaries should change or a reserve should be eliminated, they have that power; and 
there is no public recourse. Although no reserves have been de-reserved, some have seen their 
boundaries change, and there is a continual threat o f action.
Historically, the Fisheries Department has been lumped with that of Agriculture and 
agricultural interests have taken precedence over fisheries. However, the current Minister o f 
Agriculture and Fisheries comes from a coastal district as the representative of Toledo East (this 
district includes Punta Gorda and many of the areas addressed in this paper), and has more o f a 
fisheries focus. This could be good for the management o f the fisheries, but electoral politics and 
the use o f southern Belize’s marine resources by non-nationals creates an uncertain political 
dynamic. The current Minister is seen by many as favoring economic interests over conservation
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(Personal Communication, L. Garbutt, 2005; M. McField, 2005). This has led to a noted move 
away from restrictive types of fisheries management and the relaxing o f some laws.
A recent example of the impact o f ministerial power is the changing of Fisheries Law in 
regards to licenses. All commercial fishermen in Belize must possess a valid fishermen’s license, 
awarded through the Fisheries Department. The conditions for who is eligible for these licenses 
have always been controversial given the productivity o f Belizean waters. Until 2004, non­
national permanent residents were allowed licenses if  approved by a local fishing cooperative 
(Trujillo, 2005). This law changed in 2004 when the presiding Minister o f Fisheries signed a 
Statutory Instrument preventing all permanent residents from acquiring licenses (Trujillo, 2005). 
Many took issue with this change, including a number of politically powerful northern fishing 
cooperatives. Then, early in 2005, after the current Fisheries minister took over, the law was 
changed to again allow permanent residents open access to Belizean waters. This change was 
opposed by environmental NGOs who argued that allowing more fishermen in Belizean waters 
would only speed the decline of fisheries stocks (Trujillo, 2005).
Foreign fishermen are a flash point for controversy throughout Belize, particularly in the 
southern part of the country. Most southern fishermen lament the number of “non-Belizeans” 
who not only don’t speak English, but have Punta Gorda addresses on their valid fishermen’s 
licenses (Personal Communication, V. Jacobs, 2005). High fish productivity and relatively low 
exploitation has kept Belizean fisheries in fairly good condition, especially when compared to 
other nations in the region. Because o f easy access (the SCMR is basically equidistant from 
Belize, Guatemala and Honduras) cases o f Guatemalan and Honduran fishermen illegally fishing 
in southern reserves are common. Increased fishing pressure has led to the depletion of a number 
o f commercial stocks (Personal Communication, J. Nightingale, 2005; V. Jacobs, 2005). It 
may not be too far out o f character for licensing officials to be accepting bribes. In fact one Punta 
Gorda fisheries officer was fired for issuing invalid licenses in 2004 (Nembhard, 2004). In that 
case, the licenses were issued at a steep price to fishermen from Honduras, and the scandal led to
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changes in how licenses are issued. Given this incident, many speculate that corruption extends 
further up in the Ministry.
As FON, TIDE and TASTE have worked with local communities to decrease fishing 
pressure and provide alternative livelihoods; foreign exploitation has become very troublesome.
It is a problem local NGOs have little ability to change without support, not only from the 
Belizean government, but from the governments o f Guatemala and Honduras. This problem is 
being addressed through the MBRS project as well as the Tri-national Alliance for the Gulf of 
Honduras (TRIGOH). Their efforts have focused on harmonizing fishing laws and developing 
education programs. Although resolution o f this issue will require multinational approach, none 
of this will be possible without a national consensus that over-fishing is a problem. The failure of 
any organized action has been a major frustration for co-managers and community members a 
like. In recent years, fishing and the drug trade have become intertwined, making foreign 
intrusions into Belizean waters even more common and patrols more dangerous with reports o f 
chases, booby traps and gunfire (Personal Observation).
Because o f these many challenges, political will to change is often lacking. There was 
interest by local fishermen for a moratorium on fishing within the SCMR in an attempt to regulate 
illegal fishing. When this idea was brought to the Fisheries Department, SCMR management was 
told that a moratorium was not politically viable (Personal Communication, J. Nightingale, 2005). 
The national fishing cooperatives are very powerful both economically and politically and 
generally oppose strong measures that exclude anyone from fishing (Personal Communication, V. 
Jacobs, 2005). Furthermore, there are questions about who benefits from allowing foreign fishers 
into Belizean waters. Some have argued that politicians are bowing to pressure, including 
accusations that political officials are pandering to foreign interests by granting fishing licenses in 
exchange for votes (i.e. fishing licenses provide documentation that grants voting eligibility) 
(Trujillo, 2005).
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Over-fishing is just a symptom of weak political will to tackle controversial issues. This 
is not just the case for the Minister o f Agriculture and Fisheries, but for elected representatives in 
all sectors of Belizean government. As long as the ministerial system gives unregulated power to 
Ministers, there will be more problems and opportunity for corruption. Elected officials are 
aware o f the importance of maintaining constituencies and there is little likelihood they will adopt 
policies that endanger their political position, even if  these policies might have long term social or 
environmental benefit.
The impact o f national politic forces can not be underestimated in Belizean society, 
including natural resource management. Agency cooperation, planning and policy and 
ministerial power shape the ability o f co-managers to work with the government. These are also 
issues which co-managers have limited ability to change. Co-management involves power 
sharing between the government and local organizations and the current national political 
situation has made it difficult for co-managers to consistently engage government partners.
The Influence of Power and Control, Financial Resources and National Politics on Marine 
Reserve Co-management
The Belizean government is facing mounting debts which has prompted concerns about 
how investment and policy decisions are being made and enforced. As mentioned above, the 
government desperately needs additional financial investment. Financial resources within Belize 
are spread very thin which has led the government to look for investment from outside the 
country. Investors are willing to come to Belize, especially when offered lucrative financial 
incentives from the GOB (Duffy, 2002). The practice o f clientilism in the context o f a ministerial 
system, which concentrates power in the hands o f a few, contributes to this problem (Shoman, 
1994). A study by Duffy (2000) evaluated relationships between government, elites and eco- 
tourism development. Her study showed that while there were extensive laws directing tourism 
development, it was not uncommon for decisions to be made based more on informal links
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between government and investors than by mandated laws and policies (Duffy, 2000). The 
influence o f these relationships is understood both by the tourism and environmental communities 
who often feel powerless to take action to protect local and environmental interests (Duffy, 2000). 
The influence o f power, money and politics affects the ability of co-managers to carry out their 
duties.
The Carnival Cruise Deal
In recent years there has been growing concern among interest groups about the direction 
and influence o f tourism development. As the government looks for ways to encourage economic 
development, cruise tourism has been increasingly attractive. The promotion o f cruise tourism 
and recent deals by the government has led many to question the economic and environmental 
impact of expanding this sector further.
Early in 2004 the GOB signed a contract with Carnival Cruise Line. When news of this 
“secret agreement” came to light in October national organizations representing the tourism 
industry, hotels, ecotourism interests and tour operators expressed concerns over questionable 
clauses which seemed to give Carnival the ability to side step existing laws and policy (The San 
Pedro Sun, 2004). Much of the controversy focused on a portion o f the contract which appears to 
give the Belizean government no right to ensure that Belizean citizens are employed by Carnival. 
In addition, the contract binds BTB and other government organizations to carry out terms of the 
agreement, ensures no increases in the tax paid per visitor, and seems to guarantee Carnival will 
not be subject to portions of the newly drafted Cruise Tourism Policy (The San Pedro Sun, 2004). 
This could exclude Carnival from complying with laws, such as carrying capacities, that restrict 
visitation or passenger numbers (The San Pedro Sun, 2004). The contract also seemed to conflict 
with another “exclusive” contract signed by the government and Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines 
who operate the existing tourism village. These concerns eventually led to the renegotiation o f 
the contract by the GOB as well as a settlement with Royal Caribbean (Ramos, 2004b).
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Although the Carnival deal will bring money and development to the impovrished south 
side o f Belize City, many are concerned about how much of that money will actually go to the 
Belizean economy. The Belize Tourism Industry Association (BT1A), which represents the 
tourism industry, was active in challenging the deal with Carnival. They expressed concerns that 
the deal would adversely affect the more lucrative overnight sector. Although construction o f the 
new terminal officially began in mid-2005, the BTIA has asked for a judicial review o f the 
contract process (Belize Tourism Industry Association, 2005). The situation with Carnival is just 
one example o f the government’s power to negotiate important decisions of great importance 
without public participation.
During the discussions o f the Carnival deal fears about foreign workers and foreign 
influence grew. BTIA called for greater transparency in the decision making process, and 
expressed concerns about tourism dollars staying within the country (Belize Tourism Industry 
Association, 2004). After issuing this statement BTIA leadership was called “foreigners who 
want to gobble the entire tourism pie” by the PUP newspaper (The Belize Times, 2004). This 
attack is not uncommon as many of those involved in tourism, as well as conservation, are 
expatriates and concerns over environmental imperialism have grown. Some Belizeans see 
environmental protection and tourism, two areas dominated by international interests, as just 
another type of colonialism (Sutherland, 1998). These thoughts have appeared on radio talk 
shows and in the newspaper as Belizeans struggle to balance economic needs, trade dependency 
and nationalism (Personal Observation).
By entering into a deal with Carnival the government endorsed cruise tourism and paved 
the way for continued expansion o f the industry. This will have important ramifications for the 
economy and the environment. The concerns o f local people and national organizations such as 
BTIA seem justified when there is little guiding legislation or planning for cruise tourism. The 
influx of cruise visitors, if properly planned and regulated, can have benefits. If  cruise passengers 
pay entrance fees and taxes there are employment and revenue benefits for all Belizeans,
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including protected areas managers. However for these benefits to be realized government needs 
to address and manage potential long term impacts, not just short term gains. In addition, careful 
consideration should be given to the effects o f cruise tourism expansion on the growing eco- 
tourism industry.
Cruise tourism currently does not heavily impact southern Belize, although as indicated 
above that is likely to change in the near future. The example set by political elites in Belmopan 
entering into a “secret” agreement does not bode well for future public engagement in the 
decision making process. Cruise tourism may offer significant financial incentives, but requires 
proper planning and secure mechanisms to ensure economic gain and avoid adverse 
environmental effects. Local NGOs have spent considerable time and energy seeking to balance 
local social and environmental effects. A similar effort needs to be made at the national scale.
Tourism Development
The quick adoption and rapid expansion o f the tourism industry has led to a number o f 
concerns about the type o f tourism Belize offers. Across the country, but especially in southern 
Belize, there is an interest in promoting eco-cultural tourism, as proposed in the 1998 National 
Tourism Strategy. Many feel that southern Belize has the most to offer in terms o f  tourism with a 
diverse population and easy access to Mayan ruins, jungle, and the reef (Personal 
Communication,, G. Eiley, 2005). This has led all o f the NGOs in the region to promote 
ecotourism as a development and conservation concept. However, ecotourism does not bring in 
the big dollars that high volume conventional or cruise tourism can, making it unclear how much 
eco-tourism will contribute to economic development. The way that tourism development is 
planned and implemented will affect both local people and the environment, and is a 
controversial topic.
Local participation in planning tourism is vital to protecting local interests in the face o f 
growing foreign investment. Placencia is an example o f what San Pedro must have looked like
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twenty years ago. Francis Ford Copolla is just one o f the American (and European) investors 
who have bought large lots along the beach to build luxury resorts. These resorts increasingly 
conflict with local people over a wide range of issues. Despite growing similarities, the Placencia 
Village Chairman cites San Pedro as an example of what Placencia doesn’t want: extensive 
foreign investment and domination of the tourism sector (Personal Communication, G. Eiley, 
2005). Placencia has an active village council which has taken full advantage o f the Village 
Council Act. This act allows village councils to levy taxes and develop bylaws, and the Placencia 
Village Chairman has played an active role in ensuring that the community remains involved in 
the decision-making process and is consulted on proposed development activities.
Growing tourism development has brought valuable dollars, as well as foreign influence, 
into Placencia village. Tourism can raise the cost o f living and the growing expatriate community 
sometimes clashes with long held community values and interests (Duffy, 2002). The Executive 
Director o f Friends of Nature noted that FON has tried to keep the organization locally based by 
building a board of local representatives (Personal Communication, L. Garbutt, 2005). In his 
opinion a more open system could allow the large number of non-native Belizean’s living in 
Placencia to take over conservation initiatives (Personal Communication, L. Garbutt, 2005). In 
recent years the community based system has become difficult as local people are growing less 
interested in participating and there is now movement toward more interest-based participation, 
even if that means increased international influence (Personal Communication, L. Garbutt, 2005). 
Problems balancing tourism development, social and environmental impacts, and outside 
influence are not limited to Placencia. Much of southern Belize confronts these problems.
In Punta Gorda there are growing numbers o f NGO trained guides. However, guides 
often outnumber tourists making reliable employment difficult. One example is the fly-fishing 
industry. TIDE has done an excellent job o f training local fishers as fly-fishing guides. When a 
fly-fishing resort opened in Punta Gorda in 2003 some of these men were employed there. 
However, the resort relies on a small core of fishermen who own their own boats and have fairly
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consistent work during the peak tourist season. Other trainees lack equipment, and due to low 
tourist volume and the seasonality o f Belizean tourism many are unable to find consistent work.
It is common for people to move to Belize City or San Pedro where they can find more consistent 
work in the cruise industry (Personal Communication, W. Jones, 2006). Resentment about who is 
making money and who is not boils beneath the surface, and many community members feel that 
NGOs are making money while their lives have not improved (Personal Communication, W. 
Jones, 2006).
As Duffy (2000) documented, tourism developments can be pushed by politicians despite 
local opposition. Existing laws give Ministers extensive powers over protected areas and 
developers have power when they are able to secure support from high ranking government 
officials. From 2003-2005 there were at least two instances in southern Belize where tourism 
development seemed to be given precedence over community and NGO interests. In both cases 
political connections and economic interests were as important, if not more so, than community 
interest and environmental protection.
One example of ministerial intervention and tourism development occurred at Payne’s 
Creek National Park. The park was declared as a Nature Reserve in 1994 and a National Park in 
1999. The area contains a variety o f ecosystems including broadleaf forest, mangroves and pine 
savannah, and protects important coastal habitat. Until 2004, TIDE had played the dominant role 
in day-to-day management of the park the park, although official management was through the 
Payne’s Creek Advisory Committee consisting o f local community members, NGOs and 
government officials. In 2004, when TIDE received a large grant for a project targeting both 
Payne’s Creek National Park and Port Honduras Marine Reserve, clarification o f their role in 
Payne’s Creek was needed. Around this same time a politically influential family expressed 
interest in creating a resort within the park’s boundaries. This led to negotiations and ultimately 
the government granted a development concession and realigned the park’s boundaries.
Although it is unclear if and when the proposed development may take place, many groups were
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concerned. Concerns focused not only on the nature o f the development, which was to include 
canals and potentially an area for cruise ships, but also the precedent set by the actions. For 
TIDE, the deal was not all bad. The park size was expanded by almost 9,000 acres with the new 
agreement, and the realignment gave the small fishing village o f Punta Negra room to grow.
The Payne’s Creek case is an example of how political power and conservation interests 
can work together for mutual gain, but also could have repercussions for other conservation 
groups. There was a feeling by the executive director o f TIDE that the new agreement was 
satisfactory, with benefits for development, conservation and local communities (Personal 
Communication, W. Maheia, 2005). The Punta Negra community which borders Payne’s Creek 
is interested in expanding tourism. The proposed development would bring money to the region 
and could be a carried out in an ecologically sensitive way. In addition, TIDE was able to expand 
protection of an often undervalued ecological system. The outcome o f this case was likely 
influenced by the fact that TIDE’S executive director and the Minister o f Natural Resources are 
well connected, a relationship that some local NGO leaders don’t have. It is unlikely that the 
open dialogue and positive outcome o f this case will be repeated when reserves without 
ministerial connections are involved.
One o f the idiosyncrasies o f marine reserves is that the cayes within the reserve may be 
granted as a free hold, allowing land to be leased. The leaseholder then has the right to develop 
the caye. The granting of leaseholds in recognition o f political connections or dutiful government 
service is common; in fact most leasehold's are initially granted in this way. Leaseholds have 
become another area where political connections and tourism development are entangled. An 
example o f this problem is currently playing out in the Sapodilla Cayes Marine Reserve.
When Sapodilla Cayes Marine Reserve was declared in 1996, its northern border was 
marked just north o f two very small cayes. These two cayes are currently leased by a loyal PUP 
justice o f the peace. In this case, the leaseholder has partnered with an expatriate for tourism 
development. The development is to include an underwater observatory, hotel rooms, and bar
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and restaurant. The plan also includes a turtle rearing project and a sea wall. All o f this is to be 
built on two cayes with a combined area of less than one acre, in the middle o f a fragile 
ecosystem. The management o f the SCMR, local Fisheries Department representatives, as well 
as representatives from the Department o f Environment, have all visited the site and observed 
construction methods which appear to violate current laws (Personal Communication, A. 
Nolberto, 2005). In addition, the environmental impact statement seems to ignore the 
construction o f a sea wall, a development that has been forbidden at multiple sites in Belize due 
to its negative effects on the reef. Despite concerns raised by a variety o f officials, construction 
has continued. In this case the management o f the SCMR has been challenged by the developers 
to “try and stop” the development (Personal Communication, J. Nightingale, 2005). This type of 
attitude indicates the power o f political connections and the limited ability o f co-managers to 
influence decisions made far above them on the political chain.
In this case, concerns are not limited to the type o f development because the boundaries 
o f the reserve itself may be changed. The maps drafted o f the reserve did not include the two 
northernmost cayes inside the reserve. However, the GPS points cited in the Statutory Instrument 
lie to the north o f the two cayes. This has brought into question whether or not the cayes are 
within the reserve at all. If the cayes are located within the reserve, it might give more credence 
to arguments against the proposed development. In addition, clear marking and public awareness 
about park boundaries is imperative to effective management. Despite repeated questioning, 
TASTE, as the co-management partner, has not been given clarification about the status o f the 
park’s boundaries from the Fisheries Department (Personal Communication, J. Nightingale,
2005). To both managers and local people, this case has illustrated the power o f political 
connections over conservation efforts (Personal Communication, J. Nightingale, 2005).
While tourism can benefit local people, the majority o f benefits from tourism 
development remain in relatively few politically well-connected hands (Duffy, 2002). Alliances 
developed between politicians and external investors only further alienate local people from
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control over the natural resources they traditionally relied upon. Furthermore, when local NGOs 
negotiate and make deals it reinforces public suspicions about the true priorities of these 
organizations. All three southern NGOs have brokered deals with international lending groups or 
individuals that allow them use o f resources in exchange for information, land or money, 
illustrating the power of foreign influence. Belize is a country where organizations with the right 
connections have power and authority. The active and organized Placencia Village Council has 
kept local people involved in decision making. TIDE was able to ensure that any realignment of 
boundaries would be spun in a positive light. TASTE has struggled to identify powerful partners 
with whom to bargain. All o f these local organizations are trying to navigate a course that 
balances development, political realities and conservation interests. It is a challenging balancing 
act.
Financial Sustainability and the CZMAI
The Coastal Zone Management Authority and Institute has been a valuable agency for 
both government and non-governmental interests. It brought people together and influenced a 
wide range o f sectoral policy. In spite of its mandate and the projects many successes, there is a 
feeling that the growing economic crisis facing Belize as well as a lack o f government support, 
have played a huge role in the failure o f the CZMAI to have a lasting impact (Hildebrand, Putney, 
& Vega, 2005). The problems faced by CZMAI are indicative of growing concerns about the 
Belizean government’s ability to maintain services during a period o f financial duress, and an 
example o f the need for financial sustainability to ensure effective management o f natural 
resources.
The Coastal Zone Management Authority and Institute was granted over eight million 
dollars, primarily from UNDP/GEF, over five years. During this period, a number o f successful 
projects were carried out. However, eight months after funding from UNDP/GEF expired in 
2004, the staff had dwindled from 26 to seven and the political force behind the organization was
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rapidly declining (Hildebrand, Putney, & Vega, 2005). The independent final evaluation of the 
CZMAI project noted that the major drawback to the project was the failure to secure financial 
sustainability (Hildebrand, Putney, & Vega, 2005). Part of the reason given for this failure was 
grant planning that focused more on identifying potential funding mechanisms than actual 
implementation (Hildebrand, Putney, & Vega, 2005).
The major plans for CZMAI (and MPA system) sustainability have focused on user fees. 
In the Coastal Zone Management Act, sports fishing fees are mentioned as a possible mechanism 
for financial security. Prior to the 2001 elections, the Prime Minister indicated he would not 
institute any new fees on the tourism sector before the elections in 2003 (Hildebrand, Putney, & 
Vega, 2005). The implementation o f user fees requires government support, and the CZMAI and 
other organizations have found it difficult to raise governmental support for a fee based system.
In late 2003, as UNDP/GEF support was winding down, the CZMAI developed a 
complex document outlining how fees could be raised to support coastal zone management in 
addition to other funding mechanisms such as grants, donation and government budgets. This 
strategy included a proposal for CZMAI to manage G offs, Sergeant’s and Rendezvous’ Cayes 
off Belize City in exchange for the ability to collect visitors fees from tourists using these areas. 
(These cayes are heavily visited by cruise passengers.) In early 2004 the cabinet announced 
changes to the operation o f the CZMAI including: the implementation o f a US $10 fee for all 
MPAs, granting CZMAI management o f G o ffs  Caye (not the wider area) and the amalgamation 
o f the CZMAI with the Fisheries Department. These changes were not popular and ultimately led 
to the resignation o f the CZMAI CEO (Hildebrand, Putney, & Vega, 2005).
While most MPA managers supported fee collection at the MPAs, there were concerns 
about how the strategy would be implemented. The restriction of CZMAI management to G offs  
Caye, although lucrative, represented minimal environmental protection. Another major issue 
was the amalgamation o f CZMAI into the Fisheries Department. CZMAI was created as a cross- 
sectoral agency responsible for representing a wide range o f interests, not only fisheries. Many
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felt that locating CZMAI within the Fisheries Department would limit its reach, and suggested its 
incorporation into the Ministry o f Development or Ministry o f Natural Resources (Hildebrand, 
Putney, & Vega, 2005). In addition, CZMAI was regarded by most stakeholders to be more 
fiscally responsible than the Fisheries Department and concerns were expressed about financial 
management (Hildebrand, Putney, & Vega, 2005).
The CZMAI’s financial problems escalated in mid-2004 when fee collection was to begin 
at G offs  Caye. Tour operators boycotted the area and took visitors to a nearby caye where no 
fees were levied (Channel 5 Belize, 2004b). The boycott was due in part to the lack of 
consultation with key stakeholders (Hildebrand, Putney, & Vega, 2005). Stakeholders, including 
those in the cruise industry, expressed frustration at the lack o f holistic management for an area 
heavily used by cruise passengers, a situation not remedied by giving CZMAI management of 
only G offs  Caye (Hildebrand, Putney, & Vega, 2005). With the end o f UNDP/GEF funding and 
little revenue generation from G o ffs  Caye, CZMAI was forced to lay off personnel (Channel 5 
Belize, 2004a).
It is important to note that although the Coastal Zone Management Institute and 
Authority are no longer fully functional, the CZMAI project had a number of positive outputs 
including generating ecosystem data, providing training and equipment for resource managers, 
implementing educational programs and drafting o f policies. In addition, the CZMAI brought 
attention to integrated coastal zone management. The CZMAI highlighted the need for cross- 
sectoral cooperation to regulate development as well as protect the coasts ecological and 
economic resources. However, the failure o f the authority to maintain itself may have long term 
impacts. Those involved with co-management benefited greatly from the CZMAI. It offered a 
forum for discussion and gave managers support with their projects and agendas. The fiscal 
constraints and lack o f planning to ensure sustainability are similar to problems faced by the both 
the Fisheries and Forest Departments. This lack o f finances threatens the sanctity o f  protected 
areas throughout the country and has a huge impact on the operations o f co-managers.
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Issues o f power and control, limited financial resources and national politics are the most 
complicated to resolve. The example o f the Carnival deal illustrates the importance of 
governmental transparency and proactive planning in order to realize environmental and 
economic advantages. As the country o f Belize expands its tourism industry, co-managers and 
the government need to work together to incorporate the diverse needs of local stakeholders, the 
conservation community and foreign investors. The case o f CZMAI shows how interagency 
coordination, integrated management, and financial sustainability are linked and reveals the 
challenges these issues pose to effective long-term co-management o f marine resources. As local 
NGOs work to better manage their reserves, they have had little success changing policies or 
developing long term plans given the current political and economic climate. These constraints 
will likely become more pronounced if the political and economic situation o f Belize deteriorates.
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Recommendations on Working Together to Improve Co-management
Given its history of natural resource dependency, many in Belize are attempting to 
balance conservation and development. This is true in every sector o f resource management as 
issues are debated across the country. In recent years there has been growing recognition of the 
need to incorporate local people in the management o f coastal and marine resources. This lead to 
the adoption of co-management, but today co-management is at a cross roads. With marine 
reserves increasingly viewed as potential money makers, the government and local NGOs 
responsible for MPA management have been challenged to balance conservation and 
development priorities. Some o f the problems faced by protected areas in Belize and other 
Central American countries include: regional instability and poverty, lack o f government funds, 
exclusion o f local communities, paper parks, control o f land, neglect o f coastal environments, and 
sustainable management plans and policy (Govan, 2003). There is growing recognition that 
while co-management can be highly beneficial for management o f resources, there are certain 
external factors which influence the effectiveness o f protected areas management.
Given the realities o f Belize today, it has become difficult for co-managers to balance the 
growing demands o f local communities, national government and international forces. Friends of 
Nature, the Toledo Institute for Development and the Environment, and the Toledo Association 
for Sustainable Tourism and Empowerment face growing challenges as they try to ensure 
community based conservation and development, while navigating a changing political 
environment. While co-management offers a way for government, non-governmental 
organizations, and communities to collectively consider marine reserve management, discussions 
take place a highly politicized environment. Marine reserve management can not be separated 
from the political and economic realities o f life in Belize.
My intention throughout this paper has not been to assign blame for the difficulties 
encountered when trying to manage marine resources. Quite the contrary, I regard the efforts o f
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parties engaged in co-management in Belize as attentive and attuned to the difficulties they have 
faced. During my time in Belize, I was continually impressed with the dedication o f the people 
involved in conservation and marine protected area management. Nonetheless, challenges arise. 
Effective management requires recognition and action to address the wide range o f influences, 
especially politics and economics, that affect management decisions. The experiments in marine 
reserve co-management in southern Belize can inform managers throughout Belize and the 
region. Below I offer recommendations as to how local people, Belizean NGOs, government 
agencies, and international groups might work together to balance sometimes conflicting interests 
and priorities.
The management o f natural resources is a complex problem. As I have illustrated, it 
involves careful assessment o f social, economic, political and scientific factors. The use of co­
management is one way to incorporate different values into resource management decision 
making. The inherent complexity o f these issues makes simple solutions difficult. In the case of 
Belize, the current political and economic situation is likely to make the process even more 
complex. However, it is important to search for ways to improve how co-management works for 
the wide range o f stakeholders involved.
Empower the Local Communities
Involving local communities and stakeholders in the management o f marine reserves is 
not easy and local NGOs have struggled to identify ways to truly ensure local ownership in the 
decision making process. The Government o f Belize and Belizean NGOs have set up some 
formal mechanisms to include local people. However, the use o f boards and Advisory 
Committees leaves much to be desired. If  these groups remain the formal way for community 
participation, GOB and local NGOs need to carefully examine how representatives are chosen 
and local people informed about activities. Most of the organizations draw upon only a small 
core o f local elites for participation on these decision making bodies. Although participation o f
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these people, who are well respected, is important for managers, it is equally important to engage 
marginalized stakeholders (i.e. non-elites, such as those who lack equipment and training to serve 
as tour guides and women). Co-management was designed to include community members and 
stakeholders in the decision making process and if participatory methods continue to exclude 
marginalized community members co-management is not addressing one o f the major reasons for 
its use in resource management.
The current system for choosing board members focuses on the appointment of 
participants based on their involvement with other stakeholder organizations such as tour guide 
associations. This process gives NGOs control over what stakeholders will be involved and can 
limit representation to elites or people already in positions o f power, further alienating certain 
groups. Creating a democratic process which allows stakeholders to decide who will represent 
them is a possible mechanism for diversifying boards and establishing accountability. In 
addition, NGOs should specifically seek to expand stakeholder participation to include currently 
unrepresented groups. FON has tried using a board made up of elected village representatives as 
a way of ensuring some sort o f accountability and local participation in their decision making 
process. This method has had less than desirable results and FON is considering developing a 
membership based board involving democratic election for key decision making roles (Personal 
Communication, L. Garbutt, 2005). This type of change might enhance accountability, 
something key to securing strong community support.
A democratic process for board member selection should be accompanied by clear term 
limits and a mechanism for elections. This would need to be accompanied by clear guidelines 
specifying the role o f board members. Most local board members are currently unaware o f how 
their advice is used, if it is used at all, and how they are participating in the decision making 
process. Creating clear guidelines for how board and community participation is solicited and 
integrated into the decision making process might improve local participation. A democratically
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based system also can increase board member accountability which may improve communication 
and create more reliable participation in management activities.
Currently boards are not empowered to oversee the organizations activities, although that 
is their official role at local NGOs. This is not unusual in Belizean society as most decision 
making is centralized and there is little room for public involvement. An active board requires 
efforts by both local NGOs and board members to engage in the process. If stakeholders are 
convinced that their advice is actually being considered and put into tangible action, it could 
increase willingness to engage in the process. At many of the board meetings that I attended at 
TASTE, the same topics were raised again and again, making it unclear to participants what 
exactly the organization had been doing since the last meeting (Personal Observation). 
Government officials have also complained the local people are “complacent” (Personal 
Communication, J. Azueta, 2005). Complacency may be a symptom o f concerns not effectively 
being integrated into the decision making process.
With the development o f clear guidelines, it will become critical to ensure that board 
members are accountable to their constituency. One possible mechanism to attain a greater 
diversity o f local participation and more effective representation might be to offer incentives. 
TIDE has often paid for participation in consultations, something which has raised concerns about 
stakeholder motivations, but has succeeded in engaging local people (Personal Communication, J. 
Nightingale, 2005). It is not uncommon in Belize for board members to be reimbursed for time 
and travel, or even given a small stipend for attending meetings. In fact, most community 
consultations involve some sort o f food and drink as a means o f reimbursing participants for their 
time and input. In addition, compensation implies that there are expectations o f board members.
Even if  existing boards and advisory committees are reformed to include a more diverse 
range o f interests, local NGOs and government will still need to work to improve communication 
with local stakeholders. This includes greater honesty and transparency about financial dealings 
and consistent contact with community members through community consultations, newsletters,
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radio and one-on-one interactions. Community consultations can be effective if care is taken to 
plan appropriately to reach and include the maximum number of participants. All NGOs release 
some kind o f newsletter to inform local people about their activities. TIDE has developed a 
weekly radio show as one mechanism to inform local people about activities and events. The 
most effective communications are carried out by one-on-one interactions between local people 
and managers. Administrators need to be available for dialogue. Unfortunately, these types o f 
interactions are rare given the bureaucracy surrounding protected areas management.
Co-management offers local people the opportunity to make decisions about how 
resources are used. It also gives local people the opportunity to integrate traditional management 
structures and to work with the government to improve resource management. This method of 
management is often much more complicated than traditional top down management, but it can 
improve management effectiveness. Co-management requires participation by both the local 
people and co-management partners in the decision making process. Delegated co-management 
has used Belizean NGOs participation as representatives o f community interests and has allowed 
NGOs to drive the decision making process, this gives communities limited control as to how 
management activities are actually carried out. While Belizean NGOs speak highly o f their 
community relations, actual local participation leaves much to be desired. Greater community 
involvement requires that that local people are aware o f their role within the organization. It also 
requires that NGOs consider how and from whom community perceptions are collected. While 
this is a complicated process, without more inclusive and effective systems for communication 
between local communities, organizations and government agencies, it is easy for locals to be 
forgotten and local NGOs to surrender to outside national and international influence.
Secure Financial Sustainability
One of the greatest threats to effective management o f marine reserves is finances. The 
current status o f the GOB has made it necessary for NGOs to look for money outside government
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channels to fund management activities. For the Fisheries Department the potential dollars 
brought in by co-managers was a main motivation for giving up control in co-management 
agreements. There are no easy answers to the financial difficulties currently being faced by 
protected area managers across the country.
In 2003 the Coastal Zone Management Authority and Institute documented a possible 
financing system that would to support the management of the coastal zone, including the MPA 
system. The strategy proposed using a variety o f different fees depending on visitor activities and 
also included government subvention, donations, merchandizing and grants (Coastal Zone 
Management Authority and Institute, 2003 a). It was estimated that if the strategy was instituted it 
would boost monies available for management o f the system, perhaps providing for the majority 
o f money need for effective management o f the coastal system (Coastal Zone Management 
Authority and Institute, 2003a).
This strategy was generated after comprehensive discussions with a wide range o f 
stakeholders. In fact, mechanisms for coastal zone management’s financial sustainability have 
been extremely well analyzed over the five-year duration o f the CZMAI project. O f the proposed 
financial mechanisms discussed in the CZMAI strategy, only MPA entrance fees have been 
implemented. The controversy surrounding the implementation o f entrance fees illustrates the 
necessity for clarity, cross-sectoral support, and careful planning and implementation for any 
sustainability measures. In addition, revenue from entrance fees alone will likely not be sufficient 
for comprehensive management needs. The strategy itself notes that failure to implement the 
entire suite o f recommendations will severely limit potential funds (Coastal Zone Management 
Authority and Institute, 2003a). The GOB needs to continue to work with all stakeholders to 
implement the recommendations generated by the CZMAI.
In addition to the development o f reliable funding mechanisms, proper money 
management will be o f utmost importance for effective management o f marine resources. Hoi 
Chan has provided a good model for how monies can be collected and used to secure
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management. Again, the CZMAI financing strategy proposes a Barrier Reef Trust fund based on 
the model o f Hoi Chan and the Protected Areas Conservation Trust, for dispersal o f funds and 
money management. By carefully selecting members and clearly outlining the ways that money 
can be spent, trust funds can ensure that money gets where it is intended. When the plan for 
MPA fee collection was first broached with local NGOs the biggest concern was how fees would 
be distributed and managed. The creation o f a trust fund that is administered by a board that is as 
politically neutral as possible would help to ensure financial accountability.
The transparent management o f funds is key to an effective MPA system. Government, 
NGOs and local stakeholders need to understand how the financial system functions and how 
monies are disbursed in order for them to support fee collection and other programs, a point 
illustrated by the boycotts of G o ffs  Caye when CZMAI first started to collect fees. Financial 
management is also important at the local level. When local people see NGOs receiving huge 
grants but lack the understanding as to how money is being spent, it can lead to speculation and 
rumor about how moneys are being used. Although NGOs have been well trained by outside 
agencies such as MBRS and USAID and now have sound accounting systems, greater financial 
transparency can go a long way towards alleviating some o f these tensions. Current law requires 
that all registered non-governmental organizations in Belize present audited financial documents 
to the government, however few follow these rules. Although most NGOs do use local 
accountants, requiring independent external audits might be one way to ensure money is being 
spent in an appropriate fashion.
Although co-management organizations have been successful in securing substantial 
investments from a variety o f national and international sources, funding is always a challenge. 
The outside sources which Belizean NGOs have depend upon in the past are unreliable and often 
have different priorities and conceptions o f need than the local organizations. Local NGOs need 
to be clear to funders what their needs are and work with donors to find ways to secure funding 
for those needs. Although international funding will likely continue to be an important source for
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specific project funding, relying on donors for all costs seems an unrealistic option. NGOs are as 
dependent as the government on implementing fees and identifying new ways to secure 
management costs.
The Government o f Belize has made the first steps towards effective management o f its 
marine resources by establishing an extensive MPA network. This network is only as valuable as 
government’s ability to secure funding to enforce regulations and manage the system. Co­
management has provided a way for some o f the financial constraints to be met; however, co­
managers can not be expected to bear the entire burden. CZMAI has worked to develop a 
comprehensive system for the financial sustainability, only a portion o f which has been 
implemented. Immediate implementation o f the entire CZMAI strategy would be an important 
step towards financial sustainability and improved management o f the MPA system. In addition, 
government needs to tackle the tough issues o f how funds will be disbursed in a clear and 
transparent manner. If implemented and managed properly this strategy could help to secure 
benefits for government, co-managers and local people.
Clarify Roles and Responsibilities
As empowering local communities is key to co-management, the relationship between 
government and local NGOs is crucial. Genuine communication that incorporates the opinions o f 
co-management partners is critical to the success o f management. The practice o f co-management 
in Belize is currently clouded by issues of power and control. These conflicts inhibit meaningful 
discussions about policy, management, and enforcement. The CZMAI attempted to bridge these 
issues with limited success. Issues o f power and control are difficult to solve and will require 
creative thinking by a diverse range o f parties.
The lack o f sustainable financing mechanisms is one o f the main reasons that conflicts 
between co-managers over power and control have become so pronounced in recent years. The 
establishment o f a transparent financing system would have a direct impact on how the co-
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management relationship is carried out. In most cases the current system gives maximum 
authority to whichever partner is able to finance activities. Delegated management has pushed 
government authorities out o f the decision making process; while collaborative partners like 
TASTE, who have not been able to provide extensive funds for management are not meeting 
government need (Personal Communication, J. Azueta, 2005). If operating costs can be 
predictably met through sustainable financing mechanisms, one o f the main drivers o f the conflict 
will be reduced and the focus o f co-managers can return to effective management.
The predominant use o f delegated co-management has had implications across the 
system, and in some ways weakened community and government involvement. The creation o f 
powerful local NGOs has positively affected conservation efforts through reserve designation, 
fundraising, and improved management and enforcement. But delegated co-management 
organizations are autonomous and largely unaccountable, which has alienated stakeholders 
(especially local poor) from the decision making process. There has also been reluctance on the 
part o f government, specifically the Fisheries Department, to share power. Both parties are aware 
o f these issues, but seem unwilling to make sacrifices in authority to transform the process. If co­
managers are able to discuss openly the benefits and pitfalls o f co-management relationships it 
might be possible to develop more effective ways to balance issues of power and control.
For co-management to really be successful both government and co-managers will have 
to evaluate their relationships and likely give up some o f their control. The history o f Hoi Chan 
and its centralized authority have made more collaborative models difficult to implement. The 
repercussions o f these decisions need to be evaluated. The Fisheries Department needs to 
evaluate co-management on a national and case-by-case basis, allowing partners to evaluate and 
plan policies and relationships. Accordingly, many people have suggested that it might be 
beneficial for the Fisheries Department to take on the monitoring o f management effectiveness 
and integrity across the MPA system, while co-managers are responsible for more day-to-day 
control o f reserves (Personal Communication, J. Gibson, 2005). The National Protected Areas
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Strategy Plan (NPASP) offers a number o f suggestions about how co-management agreements 
and relationships could be structured. Hopefully, through implementation of NPASP policy 
recommendations and collaboration between co-management partners the nature o f co­
management relationships can be clarified.
Plan and Enforce Policies
The Coastal Zone Management Authority and Institute served an important role in 
creating dialogue between the different agencies responsible for effective regulation of the 
diverse impacts on the coastal environments. Until mid-2004, CZMAI was fairly successfully 
connecting diverse interests, engaging in dialogue and bridging conflict between agencies. The 
government’s decision in 2004 to incorporate the CZMAI within the Fisheries Department will 
only further galvanize the problems of agency authority. The dual missions of CZMAI, advisory 
and research, allowed the CZMAI to evaluate diverse issues surrounding conservation and 
development. The incorporation o f the broad cross-sectoral CZMAI within the Fisheries 
Department will limit CZMAI’s reach. In most cases the pressing threats to MPA management 
are political in nature. As argued in the independent evaluation o f the CZMAI project, the goals 
o f the Authority would be better met through affiliation with the Ministry o f National 
Development or Ministry o f Natural Resources which have broader scope (Hildebrand, Putney, & 
Vega, 2005). Movement of the CZMAI to one o f these agencies would reduce the perception that 
these issues are strictly conservationist, which could improve consideration o f the broad impacts 
on coastal zone management and might encourage greater participation in discussions. The 
recommendations and guidelines offered in the Integrated Coastal Zone Management Plan were 
developed with careful consideration o f a wide range o f stakeholder participation, representing a 
comprehensive attempt to balance environmental and economic concerns. This approach is vital 
to successful management o f MPAs and natural resources.
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In southern Belize and throughout Belize in general, protected areas have become almost 
synonymous with eco-tourism. Eco-tourism can provide economic opportunities for local people, 
but it requires local participation and benefits are not guaranteed. Any kind of economic 
development will have both positive and negative benefits which need to be balanced with input 
from locals, NGOs and government agencies. The 1998 Blackstone Report outlined an approach 
to tourism development that would focus on high-value eco-cultural tourism. Although, Belize 
does use these resources to draw tourists, in recent years more intensive cruise tourism has 
expanded rapidly bringing into question how tourism is planned and managed, as well as 
government’s dedication to the nature-based tourism strategy.
There is a need to plan and legislate how tourism development effectively in order to 
minimize adverse environmental effects and maximize benefits for Belizeans. Government needs 
to analyze how tourism will be integrated into economic plans. If  a nature-based tourism strategy 
is to be followed, the GOB will need to review current developments and coordinate with 
agencies, NGOs and local people to implement a long-term tourism strategy. If properly planned 
and managed tourism has the potential to positively contribute to the economy while maintaining 
environmental quality. Cruise tourism and nature tourism are not necessarily incompatible, but it 
will be important to develop strategies that balance both environmental and economic impacts. 
Unregulated development based on political liaisons should no longer be acceptable policy.
Once guidelines and laws are written, government will need to do its best to support and 
enforce laws. Sustainable financing measures and clear roles and responsibilities for co­
management partners will be critical to enforcement. Many o f the local co-managers have 
become very efficient at enforcement; government should continue to support their efforts. 
Government also needs to identify areas where enforcement is weak and work to fill in gaps. By 
empowering local partners the government has hugely expanded its capacity. However, that does 
not mean that GOB does not play an important role in enforcement. Laws, much like marine 
protected areas, are only a powerful tool if they are effectively managed and monitored.
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Issues o f politics have inhibited cross-sectoral cooperation, and the lack of funding for 
enforcement has reduced the effectiveness o f existing laws. In addition, the current political 
structure has stifled open policy debate, discouraging civic engagement. All of these factors 
broadly affect Belizean society, not just the natural resources sector. The complex nature o f 
resource management further complicates long term planning. There is a growing need for 
effective planning and legislative action to regulate increasing pressures on coastal and marine 
ecosystems.
From my research it seems clear that co-management has offered local people, Belizean 
NGOs and government with more effective marine resource management. FON, TIDE and 
TASTE have had clear successes and their experiences in MPA management offer insights into 
how co-management might be improved. The above recommendations suggest ways that Belize 
can improve the management of marine resources. Although some will be much more difficult to 
implement than others, it is important that all parties involved in Belizean marine resource 
management particularly address increasing local participation, overcoming partisan national 
politics and improving financial viability.
The political, economic and ecological history o f Belize has created a decision making 
process which favors short term, political expediency at the expense of long tern sustainable 
resource management. The current political climate also does not encourage constructive 
political debate and stifles attempts at compromise. As the Carnival Cruise example illustrates, 
there is growing imbalance between ecological and economic interests and a critical need to plan 
for the future. While these types o f discussions will not be easy, if co-management partners 
continue to focus only on short term political and economic interest and fail to consider more 
constructive ways to work together, marine protection and conservation will suffer. The winner 
take all attitude has inhibited integrated management at all levels. Furthermore, co-management 
can not be everything to everyone at all times; compromises need to be made. By building on
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mutual self interests and recognizing the shared value and importance o f marine resources, local, 
national and international partners may be able work together to improve management.
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Appendix A: Current Ministers
Hon. Said Musa
Prime Minister, Minister of Finance, National Development and the Public Service
Hon. John Briceno
Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Natural Resources, Local Government and the 
Environment. Minister of State in the Ministry of Finance
Hon. Francis Fonseca
Attorney General, and Minister of Education, Youth, Sports and Culture
Hon. Ralph Fonseca
Minister of Home Affairs and Public Utilities
Hon. Vildo Marin
Minister of Health, Labour and Defence
Hon. Godfrey Smith
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Tourism, NEMO and Information
Hon. Jose Coye
Minister of Works, Transport and Communications. Minister of State in the Ministry of 
Finance
Hon. Sylvia Flores
Minister of Human Development and Housing
Hon. Michael Espat
Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries
Hon. Marcial Mes
Minister without portfolio, Office of the Prime Minister
Hon. Servulo Baeza
Minister without portfolio, Office of the Deputy Prime Minister
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Appendix B: Interview Questions/Topics
1. What is your connection to marine resources in Belize? What do you do?
2. Has your role changed at all in recent years? Why?
3. How have you seen the management o f marine resources change over the years?
4. In your experience how does the co-management work?
5. What are the strengths and weaknesses o f Belizean resource management?
6. How do you think the public, NGO’s and government are working together?
7. How are stakeholders and the publics needs addressed in MPA management?
8. What is the role of the GOB in the management o f marine resources?
9. How has the policies o f the GOB effected the management o f marine resources?
10. What are the major constraints that you see to natural resource management in Belize?
11. Have you seen or do you feel that MPA management has been effected by the political 
situation in Belize?
12. How has tourism impacted the protection and use o f M PA’s in Belize?
13. How has the economic situation effected MPA management and conservation?
14. Do you think that there are adequate policies for the management o f the variety o f factors that 
effect MPA management? i.e. tourism, development, pollution, etc.
15. How do you see the future o f MPA management and conservation?
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